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Arctic Energy Cooperation
Hari M. Osofsky,†* Jessica Shadian** & Sara L. Fechtelkotter***
The Arctic — with almost a third of the world’s remaining natural gas
and thirteen percent of its oil — is one of the globe’s last frontiers for
competition over unexplored natural resources. The rapid pace of Arctic
melting due to climate change has created opportunities to extract the
region’s previously inaccessible offshore oil and gas. The 2015 controversy
over the Obama Administration’s approval of Shell Oil’s drilling in the
Chukchi Sea followed by the company’s decision to pull out highlighted the
need for clear and effective regulation of Arctic drilling. Offshore oil spills
are difficult to prevent and clean up, as showcased by the BP Deepwater
Horizon accident — which occurred in an environment not plagued by
Arctic ice and weather extremes. The complexity and fragmentation of
existing governance arrangements further complicate matters. Numerous
public and private entities are currently developing standards for Arctic
drilling and spill response as new projects and accidents highlight the
urgency of addressing risks.
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This Article makes a novel proposal for addressing these challenges
through what it terms “hybrid cooperation.” In this form of cooperation,
diverse public and private stakeholders at multiple governmental levels
coordinate their efforts through either: (1) creating institutions or (2)
integrating each other’s standards in agreements and regulations. The
Article uses original case studies to assess the possibilities for hybrid
cooperation to make Arctic drilling safer and to create more cohesive
governance. It argues that this convergence of standards and stakeholders,
while piecemeal, helps to develop norms for how to operate in the Arctic.
More broadly, this concept of hybrid cooperation — which draws from
and contributes to interdisciplinary scholarship on hybrid governance —
can shed light on governance challenges in other areas, such as
humanitarian crisis management, transnational investment, climate
change, and whaling.
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INTRODUCTION
In July 2015, Shell Oil received a controversial final approval from
the Obama Administration for its Arctic offshore drilling project in the
Chukchi Sea.1 Less than three months later, Shell Oil announced that
it was suspending its offshore Arctic oil and gas exploration for the
foreseeable future.2 Although the company faced significant public
pressure over its decision to drill in the Arctic, its decision to
withdraw appears to have been largely financial; the exploration well
contained insufficient oil and gas to justify continued drilling at a time
when oil prices are low and regulations are evolving.3 As
environmental groups cheered, Alaska Natives had a more mixed
response. Some Inupiat leaders highlighted the risks to the delicate
1 Shell announced in early 2015 that it intended to start Arctic oil drilling that
summer in the Chukchi Sea, a portion of the Arctic Ocean located between Alaska and
Siberia. See Terry Macalister & Damian Carrington, Shell Determined to Start Arctic Oil
(Jan.
29,
2015,
12:52
PM),
Drilling
This
Summer,
GUARDIAN
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/jan/29/shell-determined-arctic-oil-drillingsummer. The Obama Administration conditionally approved the drilling. Joby Warrick,
One Step Closer to Arctic Drilling? Obama Administration Grants Shell “Conditional”
Approval, WASH. POST (May 11, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energyenvironment/wp/2015/05/11/one-step-closer-to-arctic-drilling-obama-administrationgrants-shell-conditional-approval. However, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service put
restrictions on well spacing that prevent Shell Oil’s implementation of its initial plan. See
Timothy Gardner, UPDATE 2 — U.S. Walrus Protections Hit Shell’s Arctic Drilling Plan,
REUTERS (June 30, 2015, 11:53 PM), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/06/30/usa-shellarctic-idUKL1N0ZG2QT20150630. Shell received final regulatory approval to drill the two
exploration wells in July 2015, but with constraints regarding depth and ice unless Shell
could repair its ice-breaking vessel. See Steven Mufson, Obama Administration Greenlights
Shell Drilling off Alaska’s Arctic Coast, WASH. POST (July 22, 2015), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2015/07/22/obama-administrationgreenlights-shell-drilling-off-alaskas-arctic-coast. The ice-breaking vessel reached the site
by August 2015 despite efforts by Greenpeace protestors to block it. See Karl Mathieson,
Shell Ready to Begin Drilling for Oil in the Arctic, GUARDIAN (Aug. 11, 2015, 7:15 AM),
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/aug/11/shell-ready-to-begin-drilling-foroil-in-arctic.
2 See Shell Updates on Alaska Exploration, SHELL GLOBAL (Sept. 28, 2015),
http://www.shell.com/global/aboutshell/media/news-and-media-releases/2015/shellupdates-on-alaska-exploration.html.
3 See Sarah Kent, Shell to Cease Oil Exploration in Alaskan Arctic After Disappointing
Drilling Season, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 28, 2015, 7:51 PM), http://www.
wsj.com/articles/shell-to-cease-oil-exploration-offshore-alaska-1443419673; Shell Updates
on Alaska Exploration, supra note 2.
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ecological environment, while others worried about the economic
repercussions; Alaska Native corporations were co-invested with Shell
Oil in the Chukchi Sea and the industry brings jobs and resources to
coastal communities.4
However, the Shell Oil venture — despite all the controversy and
publicity — was just one among several planned and potential Arctic
offshore drilling projects in the five coastal Arctic nations’ waters. Just
a few days before Shell Oil announced the pullout, Hilcorp Alaska,
LLC filed a Development and Production Plan (“DPP”) for its Liberty
Prospect oil and gas project in the Beaufort Sea with the U.S. Bureau of
Ocean Energy Management.5 The agency is proceeding with its review
of that project.6 Moreover, U.S. activities occur in a broader Arctic
drilling context. Despite low oil and natural gas prices and public
pressure around climate change and oil spill risks that have resulted in
a number of oil companies shelving offshore projects in the Canadian
and Russian Arctic for the time being, Norwegian and Italian
companies continue with projects in the Barents Sea and Russian
Gazprom moves toward production in the Pechora Sea.7
The high profile Shell Oil approval and pullout also paralleled
important regulatory developments that reinforced both the growing
U.S. legal focus on and ever-shifting politics and economics of Arctic
offshore oil and gas. In February 2015, the Obama Administration
issued new Arctic-specific regulations for exploratory offshore drilling.8
Two months later, the United States began its two-year term as chair of
the Arctic Council — “the preeminent intergovernmental forum for

4 See Julia O’Malley, Alaska Divided as Shell Halts Arctic Drilling: Heartbreaking News
or a Miracle?, GUARDIAN (Sept. 29, 2015, 1:19 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2015/sep/29/alaska-shell-offshore-oil-drilling-reaction-natives; infra Part III.C.1.
5 See Hilcorp Alaska LLC: About the Liberty Project, BUREAU OCEAN ENERGY MGMT.,
http://www.boem.gov/Hilcorp-Liberty (last visited Feb. 20, 2016); Hilcorp Submits
Development Plan for Liberty Prospect, Offshore Alaska, WORLD OIL (Sept. 21, 2015),
http://www.worldoil.com/news/2015/9/21/hilcorp-submits-development-plan-for-libertyprospect-offshore-alaska.
6 Hilcorp Alaska LLC: About the Liberty Project, supra note 5.
7 See Kent, supra note 3; Chris Mooney, Following in Shell’s Footsteps, Oil Major Statoil
Will Also Exit the Alaskan Arctic, WASH. POST (Nov. 17, 2015), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2015/11/17/following-in-shellsfootsteps-oil-major-statoil-will-also-exit-the-alaskan-arctic.
8 See Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations on the Outer Continental Shelf —
Requirements for Exploratory Drilling on the Arctic Outer Continental Shelf, 80 Fed.
Reg. 9916 (proposed Feb. 24, 2015) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. 250, 254, 550)
[hereinafter Arctic Drilling Rule], available at http://www.bsee.gov/uploadedFiles/
Proposed%20Arctic%20Drilling%20Rule.pdf.
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addressing issues related to the Arctic Region”9 — and specifically
referenced “oil pollution preparedness and response” among its
program highlights.10 However, in October 2015, shortly after Shell
Oil’s announced withdrawal, the Obama Administration announced that
it was canceling two lease sales scheduled for 2016 and 2017 in the
Chukchi and Beaufort Seas in response to Shell Oil’s decision and the
lack of industry nomination of specific exploration areas.11
Even as Alaskan offshore drilling appears to be slowing in the short
term, the U.S. and global focus on the tumultuous Arctic offshore oil
and gas industry is warranted because our global energy future
depends on how we manage these resources. The region contains
roughly 30% of global undiscovered, technically recoverable gas —
which has not yet been found but could plausibly be retrieved — and
13% of such oil.12 Most of this oil and gas can only be accessed
through complex offshore drilling techniques; approximately 80% of
Arctic energy resources are located below a sea that is ice covered
much of the year.13
Climate change has made the question of how we regulate these
Arctic energy resources more urgent. The Arctic is warming at a faster
rate than most of the rest of the world, with major implications for the
sea ice that has historically limited access to the Arctic Ocean, its seas,
and its resources.14 The expanding open water creates prospects for
9 Arctic Council, U.S. DEP’T ST., http://www.state.gov/e/oes/ocns/opa/arc/ac (last
visited Feb. 20, 2016).
10 U.S. ARCTIC COUNCIL TEAM, ONE ARCTIC: ARCTIC COUNCIL, U.S. CHAIRMANSHIP
2015–17 (2015), available at https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/
11374/943/2015-09-01_US_Chairmanship_Brochure_2015-2017.pdf.
11 See Chris Mooney, In a Major Setback for Arctic Drilling, the Obama Administration
Cancels Two Oil Lease Sales, WASH. POST (Oct. 16, 2015), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2015/10/16/oil-drilling-in-the-arcticjust-received-another-major-setback.
12 See CHARLES EBINGER ET AL., OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS GOVERNANCE IN THE ARCTIC: A
LEADERSHIP ROLE FOR THE U.S. 6 (Mar. 2014), available at http://www.
brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Reports/2014/03/offshore-oil-gas-governance-arctic/
Offshore-Oil-and-Gas-Governance-text-revised.pdf.
13 See id.
14 See SUSAN JOY HASSOL, ARCTIC CLIMATE IMPACT ASSESSMENT, IMPACTS OF A
WARMING ARCTIC: ARCTIC CLIMATE IMPACT ASSESSMENT 8 (2004), available at
http://www.amap.no/documents/download/1058; JOAN NYMAND LARSEN ET AL., Polar
Regions, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY 1567,
1570-85, 1587-93 (Maria Ananicheva & F. Stuart Chapin III eds., 2014), available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/wg2/WGIIAR5-Chap28_FINAL.pdf.
Minimum summer sea ice in 2012 was 49% below the 1979 to 2000 average and 18%
below 2007. See Arctic Sea Ice Extent Settles at Record Seasonal Minimum, NAT’L SNOW
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commercial shipping and oil and gas exploration in places that were
previously inaccessible.15 Even with less summer sea ice, however,
conditions remain harsh, making offshore drilling risky.16 During its
most accessible period, many parts of the Arctic Ocean and its seas
(particularly North American waters) continue to experience rough
conditions, very cold temperatures, strong winds, fog, and floating
ice.17 The Arctic summer is also short, only three to four months, with
ice covering the ocean during the rest of the year and continuous
darkness in the winter months.18
The 2010 BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill — much farther south in
the Gulf of Mexico — reinforced the dangers of offshore drilling; oil
flowed for 87 days, resulting in approximately 4.9 million barrels of
oil being discharged, with ongoing significant impacts on the
ecosystem and Gulf communities.19 Although that spill took place in
the less pristine Gulf environment with its easier accessibility for
cleanup (though in much deeper water than current Arctic projects),
stopping the spill and addressing the waste posed formidable
barriers.20 Extraction and spill recovery in Arctic conditions are far
more difficult, and spills could have disastrous effects on the Arctic’s
unique ecosystem and the Alaska Natives who rely on it.21
Addressing these physical challenges adequately is made more
challenging by the complexity and fragmentation of relevant existing
governance arrangements. The United Nations Convention on the Law

& ICE DATA CTR. (Sept. 19, 2012), http://nsidc.org/arcticseaicenews/2012/09/arcticsea-ice-extent-settles-at-record-seasonal-minimum.
15 See EBINGER ET AL., supra note 12, at xv.
16 See Arctic Standards: Recommendations on Oil Spill Prevention, Response, and Safety,
PEW CHARITABLE TR. (Sept. 23, 2013), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-andanalysis/reports/2013/09/23/arctic-standards-recommendations-on-oil-spill-preventionresponse-and-safety.
17 See id.
18 See id.
19 See NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE DRILLING,
DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING 129, 165, 16768, 173-78, 180-82 (2011); NAT’L WILDLIFE FED’N, FIVE YEARS AND COUNTING: GULF
WILDLIFE IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE DEEPWATER HORIZON DISASTER 3-22 (2015),
http://www.nwf.org/~/media/PDFs/water/2015/Gulf-Wildlife-In-the-Aftermath-of-theDeepwater-Horizon-Disaster_Five-Years-and-Counting.pdf.
20 See NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE
DRILLING, supra note 19, at 90-92.
21 See EBINGER ET AL., supra note 12, at xv, 38; Arctic Standards: Recommendations
on Oil Spill Prevention, Response, and Safety, supra note 16.
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of the Sea (UNCLOS)22 helps to resolve land disputes among Arctic
nation-states crucial to establishing resource rights to drill.23 However,
in the context of offshore drilling safety, the Arctic Council has been
the most significant supranational regional entity developing
international cooperation.24 The Arctic Council is governed through a
consensus-based decision-making process among the eight Arctic
states and six organizations representing indigenous peoples, with
other governmental and nongovernmental entities serving as
observers.25 Its six working groups provide opportunities for public
and private stakeholders to give input into key Arctic policy issues;26
the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (“PAME”) working
group in particular has helped develop guidelines for offshore drilling
safety.27 The Arctic Council largely secures each nation’s compliance
with soft law norms rather than hard rules, but more recent
agreements negotiated in this context under its auspices have had
binding force and have been integrated into domestic regulation. For
example, as discussed in more depth below, the new U.S. regulations
22 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
23 In the 2008 Ilulissat Declaration, the five coastal Arctic nations, including the
United States, recognized that the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(“UNCLOS”) “provides for important rights and obligations concerning the
delineation of the outer limits of the continental shelf, the protection of the marine
environment, including ice-covered areas, freedom of navigation, marine scientific
research, and other uses of the sea.” The Ilulissat Declaration, U.S.-Can.-Den.-Nor.Russ., May 28, 2008, available at https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/
upload/ud/080525_arctic_ocean_conference-_outcome.pdf. However, the United
States is not a party to UNCLOS and interacts with it by treating it as customary
international law. See Chapter XXI Law of the Sea, UNITED NATIONS TREATY
COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_
no=XXI-6&chapter=21&Temp=mtdsg3&lang=en (last visited Feb. 17, 2016); What Is
the Law of the Sea?, NOAA, http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/lawofsea.html (last
visited Mar. 28, 2016). See generally John A. Duff, The United States and the Law of the
Sea Convention: Sliding Back from Accession and Ratification, 11 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J.
1, 10 (2006) (discussing the U.S. relationship with UNCLOS); Commander Robert C.
“Rock” De Tolve, JAGC, USN, At What Cost: American’s Failure to Ratify UNCLOS at a
Time of “Lawfare”, 61 NAVAL L. REV. 1 (2012) (analyzing the longstanding U.S. debates
over ratification and the national security questions raised by its failure to ratify
UNCLOS).
24 For an in-depth description of Arctic Council governance, see infra Part II.B.
25 See id.
26 See id.
27 See New Guidelines from PAME on Arctic Oil and Gas Safety Management, ARCTIC
COUNCIL (May 22, 2014), http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/our-work2/8-newsand-events/236-new-guidelines-from-pame-on-arctic-oil-and-gas-safety-management.
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on Arctic offshore drilling incorporate the Arctic Council’s Agreement
on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response
in the Arctic.28
The Arctic Council’s initiatives, though, occur in conjunction with
other relevant multilateral and bilateral agreements, efforts by
standard-setting and trade organizations to address technical aspects
of drilling safety, and governance arrangements involving the Arctic’s
indigenous peoples.29 Furthermore, the domestic-international
interface and relevant domestic law is also complex. When the United
States began its term as chair of the Arctic Council in Spring 2015, for
instance, that nation-state was represented by a different federal
agency in each of the Council’s six working groups.30 In addition, the
United States, like other Arctic member states, has a complicated array
of domestic law applicable to drilling safety and spill clean up,
including the Arctic-specific regulations proposed in spring 2015.31
The BP Deepwater Horizon spill highlighted the difficulties of
coordinating clean up among the federal agencies, state and local
government, and companies involved,32 and these issues would be
magnified in the Arctic because of the greater likelihood of a spill
crossing international boundaries.33
This Article is the first to examine the possibilities for addressing
these regulatory and governance challenges through what it terms
“hybrid cooperation.”34 In this form of cooperation, diverse
28

See infra Part III.B.2.
See infra Parts II.C, II.D.
30 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ARCTIC ISSUES: BETTER DIRECTION AND
MANAGEMENT OF VOLUNTARY RECOMMENDATIONS COULD ENHANCE U.S. ARCTIC COUNCIL
PARTICIPATION 23 fig.5 (2014).
31 See infra Part II.E.
32 For an in-depth exploration of these governance complexities, see Hari M.
Osofsky, Multidimensional Governance and the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, 63 FLA.
L. REV 1077, 1082-99 (2011) [hereinafter Multidimensional Governance].
33 See Arctic Standards: Recommendations on Oil Spill Prevention, Response, and
Safety, supra note 16.
34 The term “hybrid cooperation” has been used to refer to a consortium of
companies working on hybrid vehicle technology. See Jeff Nisewanger, Revenge of the
Two-Mode Hybrid, HYBRID CARS (Nov. 5, 2015), http://www.hybridcars.com/revengeof-the-two-mode-hybrid. However, an SSRN search on May 15, 2015 revealed no
articles using “hybrid cooperation” (“No results for Abstracts with title, content,
keywords or author containing ‘hybrid cooperation.’”), and a title search for “hybrid
cooperation” in secondary sources on Westlaw on May 16, 2015 revealed only one.
The one article used it in the context of the Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement
and Reform Act of 2004 to refer to “a form of cooperation less than required under
ACPERA but more than would be permitted under a stay,” and so has a very different
29
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stakeholders at multiple levels of government intertwine their efforts
through either (1) creating institutions that bring them together or (2)
integrating each other’s work in the agreements and regulations that
they develop.35 For example, prior to the Shell Oil pullout, that
company and Alaska Native corporations entered into a new venture
to collaborate in Arctic offshore drilling. The federal government has
formed subnational multi-stakeholder groups around oil spill safety
and waterway transport issues. Both the Arctic Council and U.S.
government are incorporating standards from industry organizations
or standard setting bodies.36 Although existing scholarship and reports
have identified some of these structures, none has considered how this
approach to governance provides opportunities for and barriers to
more systematic disaster prevention and management.37
This Article fills that gap. It analyzes the drivers of unconventional
energy development in the Arctic, existing hybrid governance
arrangements, and models for further cooperation embedded in them.
In so doing, the Article focuses on the crucial question of how this
governance innovation might translate into the creation of a regional
Arctic offshore oil and gas governance system that can prevent and
respond to oil spills more effectively.
Part I provides the context for the rest of the Article’s analysis of
governance. It describes the Arctic’s rich hydrocarbon energy
resources and global demand for them, the role of climate change in
making them more accessible, and the ways in which technological
developments in deep water drilling and hydraulic fracturing — paired
with disaster response — have influenced the broader market and
regulatory context.
Part II analyzes the multi-level law pertaining to and institutions
working on Arctic unconventional energy, with a particular focus on
the United States as a key example. It provides an in-depth analysis of
the international (including Arctic regional) agreements and entities
relevant to Arctic unconventional energy and their interaction with
usage than in this article. Michael D. Hausfeld et al., Observations from the Field:
ACPERA’s First Five Years, 10 SEDONA CONF. J. 95, 113 (2009).
35 See infra Part III.A.
36 See infra Parts III.B, III.C.
37 For example, EBINGER ET AL., supra note 12, at 22, 26, 28, and Edward T.
Canuel, The Four Arctic Law Pillars: A Legal Framework, 46 GEO. J. INT’L L. 735, 73942, 747 (2015) provide thoughtful discussions of some of the complex multi-level
governance dynamics and institutions described in Part II of this Article, but do not
examine how emerging hybrid cooperation might help to address these governance
concerns.
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transnational industry and standard-setting entities, indigenous
peoples, and U.S. domestic law.
Part III provides a novel conceptual model of “hybrid cooperation”
— which draws from and contributes to interdisciplinary scholarship
on hybrid governance — and then examines six case examples of
cooperation currently taking place. It focuses in particular on
innovative regulatory and institutional developments that together
demonstrate emerging cooperation. After analyzing these examples, it
assesses the benefits and limitations of hybrid cooperation in the
Arctic offshore drilling context.
The Article concludes by examining the role of these instances of
hybrid cooperation in building a multi-stakeholder regional
governance approach to offshore oil and gas. It then considers how
this model could be applied in other contexts — like transnational
investment, humanitarian intervention, and climate change — in
which many stakeholders have initiated overlapping, fragmented
regulatory efforts.
I.

DRIVERS OF ARCTIC ENERGY DEVELOPMENT

Although there has long been interest in the possibilities of massive
energy resources under the Arctic ice,38 accessing them has only
recently become more realistic.39 The confluence of climate change
melting the ice barrier part of the year with recent developments in
extraction technology have made offshore Arctic drilling possible
(though still very difficult).40
This Part provides the context for the rest of the Article by
explaining the ways in which physical, market, and technological
forces have converged to make the regulation of Arctic unconventional
energy a pressing issue. It begins by analyzing the continuing high
demand for fossil fuel resources and the pressure it creates to extract
Arctic oil and gas. It then explores the ways in which climate change
has made meeting this demand increasingly feasible. Finally, it
discusses Arctic offshore drilling in the broader context of offshore
drilling. It highlights the dramatic technological developments in
offshore drilling and hydraulic fracturing that have opened up
previously inaccessible oil and gas resources. It also considers the

38
39
40

See infra Part I.A.
See infra Part I.B.
See infra Parts I.B, I.C.
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impact of BP Deepwater Horizon disaster on the industry and
regulatory initiatives.
A. Existence of Resources to Help Meet Demand
Despite efforts to transition our primary sources of energy, 82% of
U.S. primary energy consumption still comes from fossil fuels.41 Most
relevant to Arctic resources, 36% of that consumption is of petroleum
and 26% of that consumption is of natural gas.42 This high dependence
on fossil fuels is replicated around the world.43 As of 2011, natural gas
comprised 20.0% and oil comprised 47.8% of global energy
consumption.44 These percentages reflect a rise in natural gas
consumption and a fall in oil consumption over the last forty years.45
This demand for fossil fuels generally, and oil and gas in particular,
creates pressure to access more resources through offshore drilling. As
noted in the introduction, a significant percentage of global
undiscovered oil and gas is located in the Arctic.46 All five Arctic coastal
states and Iceland have responded to national and global demand for oil
and gas by beginning to explore how to access these offshore resources
(or at least in what ways they can benefit from the resources to be
found).47 As discussed in the following sections, their efforts have been
aided by Arctic melting and technological developments, and hindered
by the difficult physical environment and low natural gas prices due to
the advent of hydraulic fracturing.48 Although the barriers may slow
development, major investments and projects are underway and seem
likely to expand in the coming decades.49

41 Total Energy: Energy Perspectives 1949–2011, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/annual/perspectives.cfm (last visited Feb. 21, 2016).
42 Id.
43 See INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, 2013 KEY WORLD ENERGY STATISTICS 29 (2013), available
at http://www.energiatalgud.ee/img_auth.php/e/ef/IEA._Key_World_Energy_Statistics._
2013.pdf.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 See EBINGER ET AL., supra note 12, at 5.
47 See EBINGER ET AL., supra note 12, at xv; Beth Gardiner, Iceland Aims to Seize
Opportunities in Oil Exploration, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/10/02/business/energy-environment/iceland-aims-to-seize-opportunities-in-oilexploration.html.
48 See infra Parts I.B, I.C.
49 EBINGER ET AL., supra note 12, at x.
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B. Accessibility Through Climate Change
The Arctic has already been experiencing major physical impacts
due to climate change. The U.S. Interagency Working Group on
Coordination of Domestic Energy Development and Permitting in
Alaska indicated in a 2013 report to the president that:
The Arctic is warming faster than any other region on Earth,
bringing dramatic reductions in sea ice extent, altered weather,
and thawing permafrost. Implications of these changes include
rapid coastal erosion threatening villages and facilities, loss of
wildlife habitat, ecosystem instability, increased greenhousegas emissions from melting permafrost, and unpredictable
impacts on subsistence activities and critical social needs.
In addition to elevating the already high level of uncertainty
associated with resource management in the region, changes
such as reduced sea ice are increasing interest in economic
opportunities such as offshore oil and gas development and
increased shipping through the region. The likelihood of
increased human activity in this environmentally sensitive
region has implications for managing a U.S. Arctic that
currently lacks much of the costly infrastructure necessary to
monitor and control the impacts of such activities.50
Most relevant to accessing offshore energy resources, the dramatic
declines in summer sea ice have created access for drilling. Multi-year
sea ice, which stabilizes the Arctic ice pack, has declined by half since
2005, and the polar ice cap has shrunk 40% since 1979. The 2012
summer sea ice covered half the area that it did in 2000.51 The extent
of annual season melt is extensive; for example, 4.57 million miles of
sea ice melted between March and September in 2012.52
Although summer melting has made new hydrocarbon exploration
possible, accessing offshore Arctic oil and gas remains challenging and
expensive. The Arctic Ocean still has ice cover for most of the year.
Even during the summer months, cleaning up an oil spill would be

50 INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP. ON COORDINATION OF DOMESTIC ENERGY DEV. &
PERMITTING IN ALASKA, MANAGING FOR THE FUTURE IN A RAPIDLY CHANGING ARCTIC: A
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 1 (2013), available at http://www.afsc.noaa.gov/
Publications/misc_pdf/IAMreport.pdf.
51 See id. at 11; U.S. COAST GUARD, ARCTIC STRATEGY 18 (2013), available at
http://www.uscg.mil/seniorleadership/DOCS/CG_Arctic_Strategy.pdf.
52 U.S. COAST GUARD, supra note 51.
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much more difficult than in most other places where offshore drilling
takes place.53
The increased possibilities of Arctic oil exploration that climate
change-induced melting brings paired with the enormous global
demand for oil and gas makes a functional regulatory regime critical.
Especially because the physical conditions increase the risks of
already-difficult extraction under water, clear and coherent regulatory
approaches are needed.
C. Technological Development
Although Arctic offshore drilling in the near term will take place in
shallow waters, it occurs in the larger context of massive technological
development driven by deepwater drilling and industry and
governmental responses to the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Even in
the comparatively easy-to-access Gulf of Mexico, deepwater drilling
barely existed two decades ago and ultra-deepwater drilling has only
emerged in the last decade, as the following figure indicates.54

While these technological advances in drilling and safety will assist
in the Arctic offshore oil and gas context, they also make regulation
more difficult. The technology is changing so quickly that effective
prescriptive regulation is hard.
Moreover, at the same time as the capacity for deepwater drilling has
expanded, hydraulic fracturing has also opened up previously
inaccessible oil and gas reserves, an expansion that will likely

53 Arctic Standards: Recommendations on Oil Spill Prevention, Response, and Safety,
supra note 16, at 14.
54 Production, Proved Reserves and Drilling in Ultra-Deepwater Gulf of Mexico, This
Week in Petroleum, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (May 26, 2010), http://www.eia.gov/
petroleum/weekly/archive/2010/100526/twipprint.html.
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continue. The U.S. Energy Information Administration’s 2015 Annual
Energy Outlook indicates that U.S. dry natural gas production
increased 35% from 2005 to 2013 largely due to shale gas resources. It
projects a 73% increase in shale gas production in the lower 48 states
from 2013 to 2040, which would result in a 45% increase in total U.S.
dry natural gas production. The following figure from that report
depicts the major expansion in shale gas over the past decade and
projected future growth.55

With respect to the Arctic in particular, there are shale formations
onshore that may be accessible through hydraulic fracturing.
However, the most significant impact thus far of hydraulic fracturing
on Arctic unconventional energy development has been to stall
offshore natural gas development projects. As a 2014 Brookings
Energy Security Initiative Report notes, “the success of the
unconventional oil and gas revolution in the lower 48 states has had a
sobering effect on how soon energy resources in high-cost areas such
as the Arctic will be developed.”56 Dropping oil prices in 2014 further
undermined current offshore projects. For example, prior to the Shell
Oil pullout described in the introduction, Chevron in December 2014
55 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2015 WITH PROJECTIONS TO
2040, at 1, 21, (Apr. 2015), available at http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/
0383(2015).pdf. Dry natural gas is “[n]atural gas which remains after: 1) the
liquefiable hydrocarbon portion has been removed from the gas stream (i.e., gas after
lease, field, and/or plant separation); and 2) any volumes of nonhydrocarbon gases
have been removed where they occur in sufficient quantity to render the gas
unmarketable.” Glossary: Natural Gas, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN, https://www.eia.gov/
tools/glossary/?id=natural%20gas (last visited Feb. 16, 2016).
56 EBINGER ET AL., supra note 12, at 7.
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put drilling plans for Beaufort Sea in the Canadian Arctic “on hold
indefinitely” due to “economic uncertainty in the industry.”57
Although this slowdown in projects provides more breathing room
for regulatory efforts, the longer-term picture likely involves increased
Arctic offshore drilling unless a major transition in energy sources
takes place. Even if physical challenges and lower oil and gas prices
delay some of the exploratory efforts, demand for oil and gas and
continuing melting will continue to create pressure to access these
resources. Moreover, some projects are moving ahead even in the
current economic environment. In the U.S. context, for example, as
described in the Introduction, Hilcorp Alaska, LLC is continuing to
proceed with exploration projects in the Beaufort Sea.58 And globally,
Statoil is producing natural gas from the Barents Sea,59 Eni is nearing
production of oil there,60 and Gazprom continues to move ahead in
the Pechora Sea.61
These developments make functional governance in this context
important. However, as the following Part explores, Arctic energy
governance is exceedingly complex and faces major challenges.
Despite the efforts of numerous governmental and nongovernmental
entities, a systematic and effective approach to Arctic offshore drilling
energy has yet to emerge fully.
II.

EXISTING REGULATORY APPROACHES TO ARCTIC OFFSHORE OIL
AND GAS

Arctic offshore oil and gas exploration, on the surface, has a lot of law
at multiple levels that applies to it. Treaties recognized by the Arctic
Council member states address property rights to the Arctic Ocean
subsurface and constrain pollution in those waters. National and
subnational laws in each of the countries help to allocate property rights
57 Scott Haggett et al., Chevron Cancels Canadian Arctic Drilling as Oil Prices Slide,
REUTERS (Dec. 17, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/17/us-chevroncanada-artic-idUSKBN0JV2UU20141217.
58 See supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text.
59 Snøhvit, STATOIL, http://www.statoil.com/en/ouroperations/explorationprod/ncs/
snoehvit/pages/default.aspx (last visited Feb. 15, 2016).
60 See High Level of Activity at Goliat Field, ENI NORGE (June 18, 2015),
http://www.eninorge.com/en/News—Media/News-Archive/2015/High-level-of-activityat-Goliat-field-/.
61 See
Prirazlomnoye Oil Field, GAZPROM, http://www.gazprom.com/about/
production/projects/deposits/pnm (last visited Feb. 15, 2016); Prirazlomnove Oilfield
— Russia, OFFSHORE-TECHNOLOGY.COM, http://www.offshore-technology.com/projects/
prirazlomnoye (last visited Feb. 15, 2016).
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to the oil and gas and regulate exploration, drilling, and spill cleanup.
The United States, in particular, has been developing new regulations
for offshore drilling generally and in the Arctic context specifically.
But this surface legal analysis masks the influence of a variety of
stakeholders through mixed public-private arrangements. At a
regional level, the Arctic Council — which involves not just the Arctic
states but also indigenous peoples and, to an extent, other countries
— plays a lead role in Arctic governance through its policy-shaping
and, increasingly, policy-making efforts. The Arctic states have varying
and complex domestic approaches to interacting with relevant
international and regional legal structures. In addition, several
transnational trade organizations have worked to establish industry
standards around offshore drilling. Within most Arctic states,
indigenous peoples have a variety of property rights and comanagement arrangements that will help shape how each country
approaches oil and gas exploration.
This Part traces the multi-level mix of law and more informal
governance arrangements that shape current regulatory approaches to
Arctic unconventional energy. It analyzes how the formal public law
— such as treaties, statutes, and agency regulations — interacts with
public-private arrangements to create a complex governance structure
in this context.
A. UNCLOS and Its Limits
As noted in the Introduction, UNCLOS is the most significant of the
treaties relevant to Arctic offshore energy development. UNCLOS
guarantees coastal states’ sovereignty over their coastal zones; recognizes
property rights — including resource rights such as those to offshore oil
and gas — over their exclusive economic zones (“EEZs”) of 200 nautical
miles and continental shelves; and protects the marine environment of
the international high seas.62 This Section describes the importance and
the limits of UNCLOS for oil and gas extraction in the Arctic.
Following a decade of negotiations, the Law of the Sea Convention
was adopted by the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea in 1982.63 As of April 2015, 167 states and the European

62

Id. at arts. 55–57, 192–237.
See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982,
Overview and Full Text, OCEANS & L. SEA, DIVISION FOR OCEAN AFF. & L. SEA, UNITED
NATIONS (Aug. 22, 2013), http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/
convention_overview_convention.htm.
63
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Commission were parties.64 This list includes all of the Arctic states,
except the United States, which largely recognizes UNCLOS as
customary international law.65 Over the past several years, UNCLOS
has served as a key mechanism for resolving Arctic continental shelf
and maritime boundary claims relevant to oil and gas development.
Under UNCLOS Article 76 and Annex II, Article 4, a coastal state
has 10 years from the time of ratification to submit scientific evidence
regarding the limits of its extended outer continental shelf.66
Historically, resolving the exact limits of the extended continental
shelf was limited by the presence of year round ice. Further, the
inaccessibility of resources expected to exist there meant that nations
did not feel a sense of urgency about this issue.67 However, beginning
with Russia in 2001, Arctic states began bringing claims to the United
Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (“CLCS”)
that would clarify natural resource rights under the Arctic Ocean.68
64 Chapter XXI Law of the Sea, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, https://
treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXI-6&chapter=21&
Temp=mtdsg3&lang=en (last visited Feb. 17, 2016).
65 Id.; see supra note 23.
66 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art.76, Annex II, art.4, Dec.
10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 7, available at http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_
agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf.
67 See JESSICA SHADIAN, THE POLITICS OF ARCTIC SOVEREIGNTY: OIL, ICE, AND INUIT
GOVERNANCE 178 (2014) [hereinafter ARCTIC SOVEREIGNTY].
68 Russia, the first Arctic state to ratify UNCLOS, submitted a claim in 2001,
providing research-based evidence that the Lomonosov Ridge was part of Russia’s
coast. Norway, which ratified UNCLOS in 1996, submitted the last of its claims in
2006 and 2009. Iceland and Denmark submitted their claims in April 2009. In June
2010, Russia and Norway, of their own accord, resolved a 20-year dispute regarding
the Barents Sea. The two countries have since begun to cooperate in developing the
vast amounts of non-renewable resources said to exist in the Barents Sea. In December
2013, Canada made a partial submission with the intention to submit information on
the limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles in the Arctic Ocean at a
later date. Submissions to the Commission: Partial Submission by Canada, OCEANS & L.
SEA, DIVISION FOR OCEAN AFF. & L. SEA, UNITED NATIONS (Dec. 29, 2014), http://
www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_can_70_2013.htm. The
Canadian position is that the Northwest Passage is part of Canadian internal waters
and is therefore an extension of the land boundary along the 141st Meridian to the
North Pole. The United States argues that Canada’s land boundary ends at the shore.
Much of the international community (Russia being an important exception) supports
the U.S. claim. Other Arctic boundary disputes include (1) the border between Russia
and the United States in the Beaufort Sea (the longest Arctic maritime boundary), (2)
between Denmark/Greenland and Canada over Hans Island (a tentative deal on the
Canadian-Danish boundary in the Lincoln Sea, north of Ellesmere Island between
northeastern Canada and Greenland, was negotiated in November 2012), and (3) a
disputed Norwegian claim to the Spitsbergen Shelf. The Spitsbergen Treaty of 1920
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The United States is the only Arctic state that cannot bring such claims
because it is not party to UNCLOS. The United States does recognize
UNCLOS as customary international law, though, and some of the
continental shelf disputes in the Arctic involve its continental shelf
boundaries.69
The Arctic states made the central role of UNCLOS in resolving
Arctic boundary disputes more explicit in 2008, the same year in
which the U.S. National Snow and Ice Data Center reported that the
polar cap had shrunk to its second smallest size in recorded history
and the Northwest Passage was ice-free for the second consecutive
summer.70 Amid growing international attention to the Arctic and
media reports stating that the Arctic states could be heading towards
war,71 the five Arctic coastal states — Canada, Denmark, Norway, the
Russian Federation and the United States — met in Ilulissat,
Greenland in May 2008. The meeting concluded with the signing of
the Ilulissat Declaration, which underscored the resolve of the Arctic
does not make it clear whether Norway has rights over that island’s EEZ. Kim
Mackrael, Canada, Denmark Closer to Settling Border Dispute, GLOBE & MAIL (Nov. 29,
2012), www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/canada-denmark-closer-to-settlingborder-dispute/article5831571. For an in-depth discussion of the legal issues
surrounding claims to Arctic outer continental shelves, see MICHAEL BYERS,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ARCTIC 92-127 (2013); TIMO KOIVUROVA ET AL.,
CONTINENTAL SHELF CLAIMS IN THE ARCTIC: WILL LEGAL PROCEDURE SURVIVE THE
GROWING UNCERTAINTY? 1-8 (FIIA Briefing Paper No. 178, Aug. 2015), available at
http://www.fiia.fi/en/publication/516/
continental_shelf_claims_in_the_arctic.
69 This renewed focus on UNCLOS also reinvigorated ratification debates, which
continue despite the last several Democratic and Republican presidential administrations
supporting ratification. See Stewart M. Patrick, (Almost) Everyone Agrees: The U.S. Should
Ratify the Law of the Sea Treaty, ATLANTIC (June 10, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/
international/archive/2012/06/-almost-everyone-agrees-the-us-should-ratify-the-law-of-thesea-treaty/258301. For a discussion of U.S. efforts at continental shelf delineation, see
Defining the Limits of the U.S. Continental Shelf, U.S. DEP’T ST., http://www.
state.gov/e/oes/continentalshelf (last visited Feb. 15, 2016).
70 Bob Tkacz, Arctic Conference Emphasizes Cooperation to Address New Issues,
ALASKA J. COM. (June 4, 2009), http://www.alaskajournal.com/community/2009-0605/arctic-conference-emphasizes-cooperation-address-new-issues.
71 ANNETA LYTVYNENKO, ARCTIC SOVEREIGNTY POLICY REVIEW (Apr. 5, 2011), available at
http://www4.carleton.ca/cifp/app/serve.php/1355.pdf; Jamie Doward, et al., Russia Leads
Race for North Pole Oil, GUARDIAN (July 29, 2007), http://www.theguardian.
com/world/2007/jul/29/russia.oil; Military Tensions Heating Up on Canada’s Coldest Frontier,
LIVE LEAK (Mar. 1, 2009), www.liveleak.com/view?i=8c7_1235958275; Russian General
Fires Arctic Warning, CANWEST NEWS SERV. (June 24, 2008), www.canada.com/
topics/news/story.html?id=ac0d24dfdc10-43da-89f3-b3c3c0928ae7; Paul Reynolds, The
Arctic’s New Gold Rush, BBC NEWS (Oct. 25, 2005), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/
4354036.stm.
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states to sustainably manage the Arctic Ocean, as well as their
commitment to international peace through law.72 It also, most
importantly for the energy extraction context, established UNCLOS as
the primary mechanism through which they would resolve existing
territorial disputes in the Arctic:
By virtue of their sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction
in large areas of the Arctic Ocean the five coastal states are in a
unique position to address these possibilities and challenges.
In this regard, we recall that an extensive international legal
framework applies to the Arctic Ocean . . . . Notably, the law
of the sea provides for important rights and obligations
concerning the delineation of the outer limits of the
continental shelf, the protection of the marine environment,
including ice-covered areas, freedom of navigation, marine
scientific research, and other uses of the sea. We remain
committed to this legal framework and to the orderly
settlement of any possible overlapping claims.73
Although the meeting and resulting Ilulissat Declaration were
helpful in providing clarity about how property rights would be
resolved among Arctic states, they did not include key stakeholders
beyond those five nation-states. The non-coastal Arctic Council states
(as well as Iceland) were not invited to the meeting, and despite the
meeting taking place in Greenland, the Inuit Circumpolar Council
(“ICC”) and the other five Permanent Indigenous Participants of the
Arctic Council — described in the next section — did not have a
formal role to play.
Aqqaluk Lynge, the only indigenous representative at the meeting,
expressed his concerns with the meeting’s limited focus on nationstate land claims and its implications for Inuit property rights:
the Inuit Circumpolar Council has been invited here, I
presume, to give you insight into how Inuit are exploring the
new question that others seem to be posing with increasing
intensity. The new question and the debate that it has
generated is an old one for Inuit . . . While “ownership” is an
uncomfortable concept for Inuit, it is a word we have to face
today because others are asking it. . . . While Inuit were not
formally asked about the borders that have been created

72
73

Ilulissat Declaration, supra note 23.
Id.
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among us, we are nevertheless practical and believe in
compromise. . . Yesterday’s debate does not only begin with
the various land claims processes in each country. It goes back
to the time when the first foreign whaling ship came in the
1600s to hunt our big whales and decimate our stocks from
which they have never recovered. . . . While we are
uncomfortable with the word “own,” I say it is all Inuit who
“own” much of the Arctic, if I must use a non-Inuit word. And
through ICC, Inuit will continue to voice this message loudly,
clearly, and collectively.74
As Lynge’s remarks illustrate, UNCLOS can and is playing a helpful
role in recommending how to divide the Arctic Ocean and delineate
state claims. Its focus on these nation-state-based rights does not,
however, specifically determine who within those countries have the
rights and responsibilities to manage the Arctic’s resources and, as
such, fails to address the rights and role of non-state actors such as
Inuit in managing and controlling Arctic development. While
UNCLOS is highly relevant in helping to create formal boundaries
between sovereign states, it does not establish needed governance
structures for offshore Arctic oil and gas development nor a legitimate
role and authority for those non-state entities that are critical to its
development. As discussed in the next section, the Arctic Council,
with its more inclusive structure but less formal authority, is
increasingly assuming that more nuanced role.
B. Arctic Council
The only fully circumpolar and comprehensive governance
institution in the Arctic is the Arctic Council.75 Arctic regime building
began in the late 1980s in Finland,76 was then superseded by Canadian

74 Aqqaluk Lynge, Address to the Ministerial Summit of Arctic Oceans: The New
Debate of Who Owns the Arctic Is an Old One for Inuit (May 28, 2008), available at
http://www.iccalaska.org/servlet/download?id=92.
75 The Arctic Council is both a transnational and intergovernmental institution. It
is intergovernmental because it brings together the eight Arctic states to collaborate on
Arctic issues, including formulating binding treaties. At the same time, there are six
indigenous organizations (Permanent Participants) that sit at the negotiating table and
fully participate and debate all matters alongside the eight Arctic states, as well as
numerous official governmental and nongovernmental observers.
76 More generally, throughout the 1970s and 1980s, regional and global attention
to the Arctic environment was minimal. At that time, the Cold War was the focus of
all activities in the region. The only evidence of Arctic intergovernmental cooperation
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efforts, and culminated with the ratification of the Arctic Council in
1996. The initial Finnish Initiative was an ad hoc multilateral
cooperation among Arctic nation-states aimed at moving them
towards a collective environmental strategy77 and emerged from a
Consultative Meeting on the Protection of the Arctic Environment in
Rovaniemi, Finland in September of 1989. Two groups were created at
that time — one focused on the state of the environment in the Arctic
and the other examined the existing legal instruments for protecting
the Arctic environment and the organization for future cooperation.
The Finnish Initiative, according to Mary Simon, a Canadian (Inuk)
involved in the process, “provide[d] a crucial opportunity for Arctic
states and indigenous peoples to devise a sustainable and equitable
development strategy for the circumpolar North . . . the direct
involvement of indigenous peoples in the Finnish Initiative should
serve to enrich this vital, new multilateral process.”78
The inception of the Finnish Initiative began a process of building a
fully circumpolar political collaboration led by Finland initially and
then Canada. All eight Arctic states committed to the idea that the
Arctic is a distinct political region and, together, set out to foster a
new relationship with the larger international community. In 1991,
the ministers of the environment of the eight Arctic states came
together and signed the Rovaniemi Declaration, which created the
Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (“AEPS”) to operationalize
the Finnish Initiative. The Rovaniemi Declaration and the AEPS
officially commenced an era of Arctic political institution building.79
during this time was the Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears, which
represented only five of the present-day Arctic states. Clive Archer & David Scrivener,
International Co-operation in the Arctic Environment, in THE ARCTIC: ENVIRONMENT,
PEOPLE, POLICY 601, 601-02 (Mark Nuttall & Terry V. Callaghan eds., 2000). By the
late 1980s, global attention had turned towards the Arctic. The reasons for this
included the rise of perestroika in Russia, growing interest in exploiting Arctic
resources, and increasing awareness among scientists of the link between the Arctic’s
physical condition and the state of the global environment. See SHADIAN, ARCTIC
SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 67, at 105.
77 Mary Simon, Towards an Arctic Sustainable and Equitable Development Strategy;
Some Preliminary Views, in PROTECTING THE ARCTIC ENVIRONMENT: REPORT ON THE
YELLOWKNIFE PREPARATORY MEETING, APRIL 18–23, 1990, YELLOWKNIFE, NWT, CANADA
(1990).
78 Id.
79 It should be noted that prior to the Rovaniemi Declaration, there was a formal
multilateral treaty on the Conservation of Polar Bears, signed in Oslo, Nov. 15, 1973
by the five nations with the largest polar bear populations: Canada, Denmark
(Greenland), Norway (Svalbard), the United States, and the Soviet Union. Archer &
Scrivener, supra note 76, at 602.
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At the outset, the indigenous groups were not signatories to the
AEPS, but instead the Arctic states merely committed themselves to
“continue to promote cooperation with the arctic [sic] indigenous
peoples and to invite their organizations to future meetings as
observers.”80 Nevertheless, the Declaration recognized “the special
relationship of the indigenous peoples and local populations to the
Arctic and their unique contribution to the protection of the arctic
environment.”81
As discussions of an Arctic Council progressed, however, the Arctic
states determined that the indigenous participants should be granted a
special status, though its precise definition was still not resolved.
There was no existing document or reference stating clearly how this
status would differ from other existing observers such as various
NGOs. Central to this ambiguity was whether or not special status
inferred that the indigenous representatives were merely special
participants or if this would give them equal standing as part of the
managerial board.82
This ambiguity was eventually resolved over the course of the
biannual meetings of the executive level of the AEPS, the Senior Arctic
Officials (“SAO”). These meetings gradually increased the scope of
interest in the initiative to include coordination with NGOs,
governmental scientists, indigenous peoples, and other actors with
expertise in Arctic concerns. Yet the role and consistent contributions
of three indigenous peoples organizations — the ICC, the Sámi
Council and the Association of the Indigenous Minorities of the
North, Siberia, and the Far East of the Russian Federation
(“RAIPON”) — led to their transition from observers to Permanent
Participants (“PPs”), with a mandate to help with “articulating the
consensus” at the SAO and ministerial meetings.83
By 1996, all eight Arctic countries had given their support to ratify
the Declaration for the Arctic Council and at that time the three initial
indigenous peoples organizations were formally designated PPs. In
2000, the Aleut International Association (“AIA”) became a permanent
participant in the first Iqaluit Declaration. The Arctic Athabaskan

80 Monica Tennberg, “Indigenous Peoples” Involvement in the Arctic Council, 4
NORTHERN NOTES 21 (Dec. 1996), available at http://arcticcircle.uconn.edu/
NatResources/Policy/tennberg.html.
81 Id.
82 SHADIAN, ARCTIC SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 67, at 119.
83 Archer & Scrivener, supra note 76, at 608.
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Council (“AAC”), and the Gwich’in Council International (“GCI”)
were then established as PPs in the Barrow Declaration.84
The structure that the Arctic Council created, which included a
formal role for indigenous organizations, did not previously exist in
the realm of traditional state-centered international relations.
Specifically, the six indigenous organizations sit at the table as
ministers, debate the issues with the other ministers, and receive
recognition by the Chair in all matters. During the two-year period
between meetings, PPs are full partners in all working groups
including the ability to submit projects and activities.85
The Arctic Council was established as a consensus-based body,
constituted through political declaration rather than a legally binding
charter. The central mandate of the Arctic Council is to help facilitate
sustainable economic and social development in the Arctic, and it
remains to date the most important fully circumpolar intergovernmental
institution. With the creation of the Arctic Council, the AEPS became
subsumed under the Arctic Council as an initiative. The overarching
objective of the Arctic Council is to “provide a means for promoting
cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic States, with
the involvement of Arctic indigenous communities and other Arctic
inhabitants on common issue, in particular issues of sustainable
development and environmental protection in the Arctic.”86
Structurally, the Arctic Council is comprised of the eight Arctic
countries and six permanent indigenous participants (all of which sit at
the table). The Arctic Council also has a total of thirty-two observers.
Observers can be non-Arctic states, inter-governmental and interparliamentary organizations, global and regional, non-governmental
organizations “that the Council determines can contribute to its
work.”87 At the present time, twelve non-Arctic states, nine

84 Arctic Council, Barrow Declaration on the Occasion of the Second Ministerial
Meeting of the Arctic Council 1, 6, 8 (Oct. 13, 2000), available at http://
oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/87/02_barrow_declaration_2000_
signed.pdf.
85 Because the Arctic Council is a consensus-based organization, PPs work
together with the Arctic states to reach consensus on all matters. Id. at 2.
86 The Ottawa Declaration also explicitly states that the Arctic Council will not
deal with matters related to military security. Arctic Council, Declaration on the
Establishment of the Arctic Council (Sept. 19, 1996), available at
https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/85/00_ottawa_decl_1996_
signed%20%284%29.pdf.
87 Id. at art. 3.
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intergovernmental and inter-parliamentary organizations, and eleven
nongovernmental organizations have been granted observer status.88
The criteria for admitting observers includes among other factors
“the extent to which observers”: (1) “[a]ccept and support the
objectives of the Arctic Council,” (2) recognize Arctic States have
“sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction in the Arctic”; and (3)
“[r]ecognize that an extensive legal framework applies to the Arctic
Ocean including, notably, the Law of the Sea and that this framework
provides a solid foundation for responsible management of this
ocean.”89 Observers must also “[r]espect the values, interests, culture,
and traditions of Arctic indigenous peoples and other Arctic
inhabitants” and must demonstrate “a political willingness as well as
financial ability to contribute to the work of the Permanent
Participants and other Arctic indigenous peoples.”90
Once admitted, observers are invited to Arctic Council meetings in a
limited, non-voting capacity. For instance, they are not allowed to
participate in the SAO meetings (these meetings are only open to the
Arctic states and PPs). They can, however, participate more fully in
the Council’s working groups. The last round of admitted countries
took place in May 2013 when China, India, Italy, Japan, and South
Korea were given observer status. In the lead up to their admission
and partly due to the unprecedented number of applications, the
Arctic Council updated its criteria for admission. Under this revised
process, an application by the EU — among a number of other
applications — was postponed.91 Despite this decision, the Arctic
88 Observers, ARCTIC COUNCIL (May 7, 2015), http://www.arctic-council.org/index.
php/en/about-us/arctic-council/observers.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Reports have argued that the Arctic Council had concerns over the 2010 European
Union (“EU”) ban on the import and sale of seal fur, meat and other products and
subsequently a consensus was made by the Arctic Council that the EU did not sufficiently
respect the values, interests, culture and traditions of Arctic indigenous peoples, which is
one prerequisite for obtaining observer status. See Timo Koivurova et al., The Present and
Future Competence of the European Union in the Arctic, 48 POLAR REC. 361, 366-69 (2012).
In a Financial Times report regarding the application for permanent status, Lawrence
Cannon, Canada’s Foreign Affairs Minister, stated: “Canada doesn’t feel that the European
Union, at this stage, has the required sensitivity to be able to acknowledge the Arctic
Council, as well as its membership, and so therefore I’m opposed to it.” Joshua Chaffin,
Canada Slows EU Entry to Arctic Council, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2009),
www.ft.com/cms/s/0/bacb51ee-34e8–11de-940a-00144feabdc0.html. The Arctic Council
ultimately deferred the granting of observer status to the EU until after “the concerns of
Council members” are resolved. Jim Bell, Canada Wants Permanent Fix for EU Seal Hunt
Dispute: Aglukkaq, NUNATSIAQ NEWS (May 16, 2013), www.nunatsiaqonline.ca/
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Council generally takes the approach that it is better to work with
interested observers than to exclude them.
The Arctic Council has six working groups: Arctic Contaminants
Action Program (“ACAP”); Arctic Monitoring and Assessment
Programme (“AMAP”); Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna
(“CAFF”); Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response
(“EPPR”); PAME; and the Sustainable Development Working Group
(“SDWG”).92 Most importantly for the unconventional energy context,
as mentioned in the introduction, PAME, in collaboration with other
working groups, has produced offshore oil and gas guidelines, with its
most recent update report in 2014.93 The Council’s first set of
guidelines, almost two decades ago, were an outcome of the Report of
the Third Ministerial Conference on the Protection of the Arctic
Environment in March 1996.94
In 2002, the Guidelines were updated by the PAME working group
with the help of EPPR, AMAP, and CAFF. The 2002 Guidelines
included the involvement of representatives of Arctic, regional and
other governments, non-governmental organizations, industry,
indigenous people, and the scientific community. Since 2002, several
new resources have been made available and in 2014 the guidelines
were once again updated.95 Section III.B.1 discusses the 2014
guidelines in more depth.96
Growing interest in the Arctic has also prompted the Arctic Council
to move away from being a consensus based, policy-shaping
organization into being more of a policymaking regime in some
instances. Most noteworthy in the context of oil and gas development
are the 2011 Agreement on Cooperation in Aeronautical and Maritime
Search and Rescue in the Arctic (“SAR”); 2013 Agreement on
Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution, Preparedness and Response in
the Arctic; and 2015 Framework Plan for Cooperation on Prevention
of Oil Pollution from Petroleum and Maritime Activities in the Marine
Areas of the Arctic.97 As discussed in more depth in Part III, the 2015
stories/article/65674canada_wants_permanent_fix_for_eu_seal_hunt_dispute_aglukkaq.
92 Working Groups, ARCTIC COUNCIL (June 29, 2015), http://www.arctic-council.
org/index.php/en/about-us/working-groups.
93 New Guidelines from PAME on Arctic Oil and Gas Safety Management, supra note 27.
94 Id.
95 New Guidelines from PAME on Arctic Oil and Gas Safety Management, PAME (May
5, 2014), http://pame.is/index.php/shortcode/blog/item/30-aoogg-2014/30-aoogg-2014.
96 See infra Part III.B.1.
97 See Press Release, Arctic Council, Arctic Council Renews Commitment to Arctic
Economic and Social Development and Environmental Protection (Apr. 24, 2015),
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Framework Plan, approved by the Arctic state ministers on April 24,
2015, supports cooperation among not only Arctic nations, but also
with industry and indigenous peoples.98
Aside from the formal working groups, in May 2013, as part of
Canada’s chairmanship, the Arctic Council agreed to establish a
circumpolar business forum. The mandate of this new Arctic
Economic Council is to “foster business development in the Arctic,
engage in deeper circumpolar cooperation, and provide a business
perspective to the work of the Arctic Council.”99 The founding
meeting took place in September 2014 in Iqaluit, Nunavut, Canada.
Several oil and gas industry executives are part of this Council as
nominated representatives of Arctic states in this process.100
The transition of the Arctic Council Chairmanship in April 2015
from Canada to the United States (2015–17) brought additional focus
on unconventional energy development. This emphasis on
unconventional energy began in the lead up to the Chairmanship. For
example, Senator Murkowski of Alaska made the following comments
on the Senate floor upon her return from the Arctic Council
ministerial meeting in Kiruna, Sweden in May 2013:
In 2015, the gavel of that chairmanship will pass from Canada
to the United States, so we will be working to set the agenda,
although it is a very consensus-driven process . . . . [T]hese
consensus initiatives that help to advance the dynamic in an
evolving part of the world. In Nuuk, the first-ever binding
agreement of the parties was entered into, and this was a
search-and-rescue agreement . . . .
Yesterday, in Kiruna, it was the adoption of the Agreement on
Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and
Response in the Arctic. There is a recognition that in the

available at http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/ministerial-meetings/27-iqaluitministerial-2015/94-news-release-post-iqaluit; Agreements, ARCTIC COUNCIL, http://www.
arctic-council.org/index.php/en/our-work/agreements (last updated Sept. 16, 2015).
98 See ARCTIC COUNCIL, FRAMEWORK PLAN FOR COOPERATION ON PREVENTION OF OIL
POLLUTION FROM PETROLEUM AND MARITIME ACTIVITIES IN THE MARINE AREAS OF THE ARCTIC
(Apr. 24, 2015), available at https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/
11374/609/ACMMCA09_Iqaluit_2015_SAO_Report_Annex_3_TFOPP_Framework_Plan.
pdf [hereinafter FRAMEWORK PLAN FOR COOPERATION].
99 Arctic Economic Council, ARCTIC COUNCIL (Jan. 28, 2014), http://www.arcticcouncil.org/index.php/en/our-work2/8-news-and-events/195-aec-2.
100 See Representatives, ARCTIC ECON. COUNCIL (2016), http://arcticeconomiccouncil.
com/about-us/representatives.
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Arctic, where some 15 percent of the world’s known oil and
gas reserves are situated, there will be activity. We are seeing it
in Russia to our left-hand side; we are seeing it in Canada to
our right-hand side. In the United States, as we all know, Shell
attempted to begin exploration this year. There have been
previous exploration efforts up in the Beaufort and in the
Chukchi. Whether you are for or against oil development here
in this country, the recognition is that within the Arctic
nations there is activity. There are ongoing efforts, whether it
is through exploration or, hopefully, production that will
move forward.
. . . [W]e are putting forward collaboration and collective
agreements so there is an understanding that in the event —
hopefully, a very unlikely event — something would ever
happen, there is an understanding as to how all the nations
act, the level of preparation that moves forward.101
In light of these interests, the United States established that its
Chairmanship will include a focus on better preparation for a
maritime disaster or oil spill, increasing resiliency in Arctic
communities, and establishing new marine protected areas.102 This
includes increased “sharing of oil spill preparedness and response
capabilities” and the continued development of specialized pollution
response resources and operational guidelines for responses in broken
ice and ice-covered areas.103 The United States also seeks to improve
SAR through the coordination of table-top exercises and possibly a
“full scale live exercise.”104 In recognition of this role, a number of the
key think tanks making recommendations in the lead up to the
Chairmanship focused specifically on how the U.S. chairmanship
could be used to address offshore oil and gas regulation.105
The Arctic Council — despite its limited formal authority — is
playing a key role in involving public and private stakeholders to
101 Congressional Record, Volume 159, Number 69 (Thursday, May 16, 2013), GOV’T
PUBLISHING OFF., https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2013-05-16/html/CREC-201305-16-pt1-PgS3538-2.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2016).
102 See One Arctic: Shared Opportunities, Challenges and Responsibilities, U.S. DEP’T
ST. (2014), http://www.state.gov/e/oes/ocns/opa/arc/uschair.
103 Julie Gourley, One Arctic: Shared Opportunities, Challenges and Responsibilities,
U.S. DEP’T ST. 1, 12 (2014), http://www.knom.org/wp-audio/2014/11/2014-11-03-USChair-Arctic-Council.pdf.
104 Id. at 13.
105 See EBINGER ET AL., supra note 12, at 48-54.
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establish a regional approach to addressing the risks of offshore oil
and gas development. Yet how much the United States can accomplish
during its chairmanship and whether or not the land locked country of
Finland will place equal emphasis on this issue when it takes the
Chairmanship in 2017 remains to be seen.106
Moreover, additional Arctic Council governance issues likely will
influence its role in the oil and gas context. First, a key issue facing
the Arctic Council is whether or not the PPs will continue to maintain
their authority in the face of its increasing efforts to make formally
binding policies. The indigenous organizations that serve as PPs play a
limited (and at times nonexistent) role in traditional treaty making. At
the same time, their inclusion is critical because indigenous peoples in
many cases have rights — which at times include ownership — to the
lands, seas and resources where they live. Other commentators worry
more generally about the diluting effect of new powerful nation-state
observers, as well as the increasing number of observers in other
categories despite recent efforts to limit that growth.107
Second, the U.S. domestic interface with the Arctic Council remains
highly fragmented with different agencies serving as leads for each of
the six working groups. Although the State Department officially
serves in a coordinating role, the United States will need to make sure
that its approach is more coherent and coordinated in order to
maximize its effectiveness during its term as chair. In one step in this
direction, on January 21, 2015, President Obama signed an Executive
Order 13689 on Enhancing Coordination of National Efforts in the
Arctic.108 The executive order “established an Arctic Executive
Steering Committee (“Steering Committee”), which shall provide
guidance to executive departments and agencies (“agencies”) and
enhance coordination of Federal Arctic policies across agencies and
offices, and, where applicable, with State, local, and Alaska Native
tribal governments and similar Alaska Native organizations, academic
and research institutions, and the private and nonprofit sectors.”109

106 For a discussion of the current U.S. work under its Chairmanship, see U.S.
Chairmanship 2015–2017, ARCTIC COUNCIL (2015), http://www.arctic-council.org/
index.php/en/about-us/arctic-council/u-s-chairmanship.
107 See Andrea Charron, Has the Arctic Council Become Too Big?, INT’L REL. &
SECURITY NETWORK (Aug. 15, 2014), http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/
Detail/?id=182827 (exploring the complexities of this expansion).
108 See generally Exec. Order No. 13,689, 80 Fed. Reg. 4191 (Jan. 26, 2015), available at
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201500039/pdf/DCPD-201500039.pdf.
109 Id. In particular, its charge has been described as follows:
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The Steering Committee includes representatives from the key
agencies involved in Arctic-relevant issues, and may help address some
of the fragmentation concerns with the U.S. interface with the Arctic
Council over time.110

The Steering Committee, in coordination with the heads of relevant agencies
and under the direction of the Chair, shall:
(a) provide guidance and coordinate efforts to implement the priorities,
objectives, activities, and responsibilities identified in National Security
Presidential Directive 66/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 25, Arctic
Region Policy, the National Strategy for the Arctic Region and its
Implementation Plan, and related agency plans;
(b) provide guidance on prioritizing Federal activities, consistent with
agency authorities, while the United States is Chair of the Arctic Council,
including, where appropriate, recommendations for resources to use in
carrying out those activities; and
(c) establish a working group to provide a report to the Steering Committee
by May 1, 2015, that:
(i) identifies potential areas of overlap between and within agencies with
respect to implementation of Arctic policy and strategic priorities and
provides recommendations to increase coordination and reduce any
duplication of effort, which may include ways to increase the effectiveness of
existing groups; and
(ii) provides recommendations to address any potential gaps in
implementation.
....
[D]evelop a process to improve coordination and the sharing of information
and knowledge among Federal, State, local, and Alaska Native tribal
governments and similar Alaska Native organizations, and private-sector and
nonprofit-sector groups on Arctic issues; . . . [In order to do this the steering
committee will] establish a process to ensure tribal consultation and
collaboration, consistent with my memorandum of November 5, 2009
(Tribal Consultation).
110

See id. Specifically, it includes:
(i) the heads, or their designees, of the Office of Science and Technology
Policy, the Council on Environmental Quality, the Domestic Policy Council,
and the National Security Council;
(ii) the Executive Officer of the Steering Committee, who shall be designated
by the Chair of the Steering Committee (Chair); and
(iii) the Deputy Secretary or equivalent officer from the Departments of
State, Defense, Justice, the Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, Labor, Health
and Human Services, Transportation, Energy, and Homeland Security; the
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Finally, beyond any direct questions of the Arctic Council’s
governance role and effectiveness, several other entities are also
addressing standards and resource management issues regarding
offshore drilling and oil spills. The following sections detail those
additional roles and the complexity that they add.
C. Trade Associations and Standard Setting Organizations
Parallel to the supranational agreements reached through UNCLOS
and the latest agreements concerning offshore activities by the Arctic
Council, several trade associations and standard-setting organizations
— most notably the American Petroleum Institute; International Oil
and Gas Producers Association; IPIECA, the global oil and gas
industry association for environmental and social issues; and
International Organization for Standardization — have all taken recent
steps to try to support safer and more effective industry practices.111
This Section describes the efforts of those four entities, as well as some
of the other oil and gas industry activities.
The American Petroleum Institute (“API”) is a U.S. national trade
association that focuses on all aspects of the oil and natural gas industry.
It originated during World War I, when the oil and gas industry worked
together with Congress to support the war effort. Its members “are
dedicated to continuous efforts to improve the compatibility of their
operations with the environment while economically developing energy
resources and supplying high quality products and services to
consumers.”112 API has helped to develop oil and gas industry
equipment and operating standards since 1924. It works with industry
experts to maintain over 600 standards and recommended practices,
and distributes over 300,000 documents annually.113
API has issued several standards regarding offshore drilling, including
ones on pipelines, platforms, and safety management in offshore

Office of the Director of National Intelligence; the Environmental Protection
Agency; the National Aeronautics and Space Administration; the National
Science Foundation; the Arctic Research Commission; and the Office of
Management and Budget; the Assistant to the President for Public
Engagement and Intergovernmental Affairs, or his or her designee; and other
agencies or offices as determined appropriate by the Chair.
111

See EBINGER ET AL., supra note 12, at 21-33.
About API, AM. PETROLEUM INST., http://www.api.org/globalitems/globalheaderpages/
about-api (last visited Mar. 28, 2016).
113 Publications, Standards, and Statistics Overview, AM. PETROLEUM INST.,
http://www.api.org/publications-standards-and-statistics (last visited Mar. 28, 2016).
112
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operations.114 Its RP 2N standard focuses on “Planning, Designing, and
Constructing Structures and Pipelines for Arctic Conditions” in
particular, indicating that it should be used together with other offshore
drilling-related standards. It provides recommended practice for the
Arctic environment for several systems, including:
• offshore concrete, steel, and hybrid structures, sand islands,
and gravel islands used as platforms for exploration, drilling or
production;
• offshore ice islands used as platforms for exploration
drilling;
• near shore causeways;
• offshore pipelines; and
• shore crossings for pipelines115
The International Association of Oil and Gas Producers (“IOGP”)
provides a forum for leading publicly-traded, private and state-owned
oil and gas companies, industry associations, and major upstream
service companies to identify and share best practices. IOGP was
formed in 1974 to foster effective communications between the evermore complex network of international regulators and upstream
industry. Its members produce over half of the world’s oil and roughly
a third of its gas, making it a particularly significant association.116
In 2014, IOGP formed an Arctic Committee out of a recognition of
the region’s important role in meeting the world’s energy demand in
coming decades. That committee will:
• Act as the technical and advocacy focal point for the E&P
industry on issues related to upstream activities in the Arctic
and cold region environments more generally, consistent with
the principles of sustainability.
• Develop a long-term strategy to address the key Arctic
issues for the upstream industry.

114

See EBINGER ET AL., supra note 12, at 30.
See AM. PETROLEUM INST., PUBLICATIONS, PROGRAMS AND SERVICES 1-42 (2014),
available at http://www.api.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Catalog/Final-catalog.pdf
(listing the recommended practices and requirements for these systems).
116 See About IOGP, INT’L ASS’N OIL & GAS PRODUCERS, http://www.iogp.org/AboutIOGP (last visited Mar. 28, 2016).
115
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• Review and shape work of global importance being carried
out within IOGP standing committees and in other entities
regarding the development of good practices and guidelines
associated with working in Arctic conditions.
• Monitor, review and contribute to international and
regional regulatory and policy developments in relation to the
Arctic.
• Establish and support industry positions with respect to
regulatory developments and, through the IOGP secretariat,
advocate and communicate those positions in close liaison
with national/regional associations.117
IOGP also established the Arctic Coordination Task Force to serve
as the “technical and advocacy focal point for the E&P industry on
issues related to upstream activities in the Arctic.” The task force has
the following objectives:
• Develop a long-term strategy to address the key arctic issues
for upstream industry
• Review and shape projects of pan-arctic importance being
carried out within OGP and other entities
• Monitor, review and contribute to and provide advocacy on
policy and regulatory developments affecting the Arctic
• Advise IOGP of issues impacting industry’s ability to gain
access and operate in arctic regions.118
The task force is currently focusing on issues of Arctic science, Arctic
spill response, climate change mitigation, the effect of sounds on marine
life, the development of technology and operating standards, natural
resources development and management, and indigenous peoples.119
In addition, IOGP has developed and published guidelines and a
good practice guide for Arctic environmental protection. It produced
recommendations for preventing, intervening and responding to well
incidents in the aftermath of the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster. It also
helped to form the Arctic Oil Spill Response Technology Joint

117 See INT’L ASS’N OF OIL & GAS PRODUCERS, OGP HIGHLIGHTS 1 (Feb.–Mar. 2014),
available at http://www.iogp.org/PapersPDF/1403.pdf.
118 See Arctic Committee, INT’L ASS’N OIL & GAS PRODUCERS, http://www.iogp.org/
arctic-committee (last visited Mar. 28, 2016).
119 See id.
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Industry Programme (“JIP”), which brings together companies to
research and develop technologies and approaches for responding to
Arctic marine oil spills. IOGP advocated for the formation of the
Subsea Well Response Project (“SWRP”), serves as a nongovernmental observer to the Convention for the Protection of the
Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (“OSPAR”), and
applied for — but was denied — Arctic Council observer status.120
Like IOGP, IPIECA is a “global oil and gas industry association for
environmental and social issues” formed in 1974. Its members also
produce over half the world’s oil, but, unlike IOGP, they include both
upstream and downstream oil and gas industry participants. Its
formation was tied to the launch of the United Nations Environment
Programme (“UNEP”), and IPIECA serves as the primary mechanism
through which the industry communicates with the United Nations.121
IPIECA has oil spill preparedness as one of its focus areas,122 and
has been very active on Arctic issues. In 2009, IPIECA created an Oil
Spill Response in the Arctic Task Force focused on improving
“coordination of industry efforts in identifying research needs for
spills in cold environments.” Its initial meeting in 2009 aimed to
advance work on an IPIECA/API publication on Oil Spill Response in
Arctic and Cold Climate Conditions, and to analyze technology and
research needs regarding spills in cold environments.123 IPIECA also
co-authored a report with IOGP on Spill Response in the Arctic Offshore
that the JIP used as the basis for a white paper.124
The International Organization for Standardization (“ISO”) is an
independent, non-governmental membership organization that
develops voluntary international standards. It has sixty-three member
countries and is the largest organization of its kind in the world. ISO’s
Technical Committee 67 focuses on structures used in offshore oil and
gas exploration. The Committee’s scope includes “[s]tandardization of
the materials, equipment and offshore structures used in the drilling,
production, transport by pipelines and processing of liquid and
120

See EBINGER ET AL., supra note 12, at 31.
See About Us, IPIECA, http://www.ipieca.org/about-us (last visited Mar. 28,
2016).
122 See Oil Spill Preparedness, IPIECA, http://www.ipieca.org/focus-area/oil-spillpreparedness (last visited Mar. 28, 2016).
123 See Oil Spill Response in the Arctic Task Force Formed, IPIECA (Oct. 14, 2009),
http://www.ipieca.org/?q=news/20091015/oil-spill-response-arctic-task-force-formed.
124 See ARCTIC RESPONSE TECH. OIL SPILL PREPAREDNESS, SPILL RESPONSE IN THE
ARCTIC OFFSHORE 1 (2012), available at http://www.arcticresponsetechnology.org/
wpcontent/uploads/2012/11/FINAL-printed-brochure-for-ATC.pdf.
121
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gaseous hydrocarbons within the petroleum, petrochemical and
natural gas industries.”125 The ISO has published 198 standards related
to this Committee, with twenty-three under its direct responsibility.
Thirty-two countries are participating in this Committee and thirtyfour more are observing.126
Through its committee working on offshore drilling, the ISO has
done significant standards development focused on the Arctic. Its ISO19906 standard addresses Arctic offshore structures, and several Arctic
nations are adopting it.127 The ISO also created Subcommittee 8 on
Arctic operations within Technical Committee 67.128 The
Subcommittee has established working groups on the working
environment; escape, evacuation, and rescue; environmental
monitoring; ice management; Arctic materials; physical environment
for Arctic operations; and man-made islands and land extension. This
subcommittee will also be responsible for developing standards for oil
and gas operations in cold climate regions that aim to ensure safe and
effective Arctic oil and gas operations and protection of the
environment and the people working and living in these regions.129
Other entities discussed in this Section are working to collaborate
with the ISO. For example, the IOGP’s Arctic Coordination Task Force
is seeking to be a formal liaison to Subcommittee 8. In addition, the
Barents 2020 project, which focuses on developing safety standards for
the Barents Sea between Russia and Norway, has submitted
recommendations to the ISO.130
These various interrelated efforts by leading industry and standard
setting organizations are only some of the most Arctic specific and
well developed. Numerous other private and public-private entities are
125 ISO/TC 67 Materials, Equipment and Offshore Structures for Petroleum,
Petrochemical and Natural Gas Industries, ISO, http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_technical_
committee?commid=49506 (last visited Mar. 28, 2016).
126 See id.
127 See ISO 19906:2010, ISO (Dec. 15, 2010), http://www.iso.org/iso/catalogue_
detail.htm?csnumber=33690; EBINGER ET AL., supra note 12, at 33 (stating that the
European Union has adopted it, while Russia and Canada are in the process of
adopting it).
128 See ISO/TC 67/SC 8 Arctic Operations, ISO (2011), http://www.iso.org/iso/
standards_development/technical_committees/other_bodies/iso_technical_committee.htm?
commid=652790.
129 See id.; ISO/TC 67/SC 8 — Arctic Operations, Standards Catalogue, ISO (2016),
http://www.iso.org/iso/home/store/catalogue_tc/catalogue_tc_browse.htm?commid=65279
0&development=on.
130 See EBINGER ET AL., supra note 12, at 28-30; Barents 2020 Reports, DNVGL
(2016), https://www.dnvgl.com/oilgas/arctic/barents-2020-reports.html.
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doing work on relevant standards and safety in the Arctic offshore
environment. The Brookings Energy Security Initiative Report
highlights several additional initiatives and organizations beyond these
examples.131 This quasi-regulatory behavior — these standards are
generally voluntary — form an important part of how corporate efforts
to develop Arctic offshore resources are governed. Because these
organizations have such a broad membership in the oil and gas
industry and collaborate with national governments, their standards
end up influencing transnational behavior of companies with Arctic
operations. Moreover, as discussed in Part III, these standards are
becoming part of governmental regulation through incorporation,
such as in emerging U.S. standards for offshore oil and gas exploration
in the Arctic.
D. Public-Private Co-Management Arrangements
Industry-based entities are not the only private actors with significant
governance responsibilities in the Arctic. The indigenous peoples of the
Arctic are not simply affected by climate change and offshore drilling.
They also have long-standing co-management arrangements with
national governments and have developed their own corporate entities
involved in aspects of oil and gas development. While it varies among
Arctic states the extent to which indigenous peoples have shared
authority over land and offshore resources, they have in certain places
attained resource, land, and property rights in the Arctic and have
organized to serve as an important voice in decision-making in
international, regional, and national governmental processes.
Land claim processes in both the United States and Canada over the
past four decades have resulted in arrangements that provide
indigenous communities with some formal control. The historic
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (“ANCSA”) in 1971 led to a
number of native controlled governments including the North Slope
Borough in 1972, a public government with an Inupiat majority.
ANCSA also helped establish thirteen regional for profit corporations
to facilitate the transfer of property and monetary compensation. Such
corporations include the Arctic Slope Regional Corporation and
NANA (Inupiat are the shareholders for both of them). In Canada, the
federal government has settled a number of Northern land claims. For
instance, in the specific context of Inuit land claims, the James Bay
and Northern Quebec Agreement (“JBNQA”) of 1975 became the first
131

See also EBINGER ET AL., supra note 12, at 31-32.
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Inuit land claims agreement. This was followed by the Inuvialuit Final
Agreement, Northwest Territories in 1984; the Nunavut Agreement in
1993 (which came into effect in 1999); and the Inuit agreement in
Labrador in 2005. Finally, in Nunavik, a series of agreements were
reached with the federal government in 2007.132 Canadian Inuit have
also developed major corporations with substantial revenues over this
same time period — such as Makivik Corporation in Northern Quebec
and Nunavut Tunngavik Inc. (“NTI”) in Nunavut, both of which
closely interact with the governmentally-constituted arrangements.
These North American grants of power to indigenous communities
vary in the form of governance they create. The Arctic Human
Development Report (“AHDR”), for instance, distinguishes between
devolution and co-management arrangements: “Devolution refers to the
transfer of power to more local and regional jurisdictions and
governments” whereas co-management “typically involves a sharing of
power between the state and resource-user communities.”133 Examples
of devolution include the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act
(“ANCSA”) and the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement. Co-management
pertains specifically to resource use and is a regime in which
stakeholders share power in managing specific resources. In the North
American context, co-management commonly refers to a “shared
decision-making process, formal or informal, between a government
authority and a user group for managing a species of fish and wildlife,
or other resource[s].”134 Co-management, as such, is not merely about
consultation with indigenous communities after a project has been
determined, but includes local community involvement from a project’s

132 ANCSA was the first Inuit land claim agreement which was signed in 1971. This
was followed by the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement (“JBNQA”) passed in
1975; the Inuvialuit Final Agreement, Northwest Territories in 1984; the Nunavut
Agreement in 1993 (put into effect in 1999); the Inuit agreement in Labrador in 2005
and finally, in Nunavik, a series of agreements were reached with the federal
government in 2007.
133 RICHARD A. CAULFIELD ET AL., ARCTIC HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 121, 129 (2004),
available at http://svs.is/images/pdf_files/ahdr/English_version/AHDR_chp_7.pdf.
134 Id. at 131. Co-management systems include a system of rights and obligations,
rules that outline all shareholders responsibilities, and collective decision-making. See
id. Co-management, as practiced in the Arctic, offers a space for knowledge sharing
between users and scientists; acts as a balancing of power between users and
government officials; provides a means for continual cooperation in research,
education, and management; and recognizes cultural and linguistic differences as they
impact effective understanding. See also id. at 129-31; F. Berkes et al., Co-Management:
The Evolution in Theory and Practice of the Joint Administration of Living Resources,
18 ALTERNATIVES 1, 11-18 (1991).
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inception. It thus serves as an important force shaping oil and gas
development in communities whose rights extend to those resources.
The governance role of indigenous communities and Inuit
communities in particular has translated into a number of specific
initiatives with relevance for Arctic unconventional energy
development. For instance, the Nunavut Community-Based Wildlife
Monitoring Network, among other tasks, acquires data and Inuit and
local ecological knowledge relating to management zones, critical
harvesting and other areas. It also documents species abundance and
movement patterns, for setting wildlife research and management
priorities.135 These efforts are critical pieces of the larger scientific
research that encompasses any type of resource extraction including
Arctic offshore oil and gas development.
Another example, which will be explored in more depth in Part III,
is the Prince William Sound Regional Citizens’ Advisory Council. This
council was set up in the wake of the Exxon Valdez oil spill. Its mission
is to promote environmentally safe operation of the Alyeska Pipeline
marine terminal in Valdez and the oil tankers that use it. The council
explains that it “regularly retains experts in various fields to conduct
independent research on issues related to oil transportation safety.”136
These initiatives often complement and reflect the particularities of
the governance and property rights that indigenous communities have
obtained. For example, in most parts of the Canadian Arctic where
there are land claims settlements, aboriginal environmental
governance is a process of joint jurisdiction that legally specifies both
aboriginal and government rights and responsibilities. The established
comprehensive claims agreements have one or more sections
specifying how the jurisdiction for fisheries and wildlife management
are shared; these co-management boards are the main instruments of
resource management.137 For instance, the Beaufort Sea Integrated
Management Planning Initiative (“BSIMPI”) started in 1999 with the
collaboration of Inuvialuit management and co-management bodies,
Department of Fisheries and Oceans (“DFO”), Department of Indian
and Northern Affairs (“INAC”), and the oil and gas industry. The
135 See Community-Based Wildlife Monitoring Network, NUNAVUT WILDLIFE MGMT. BOARD
(2016), http://www.nwmb.com/en/component/content/article/97-english/sidebars/currentinitiatives/107-community-based-wildlife-monitoring-network.
136 About Us, PRINCE WILLIAM SOUND REGIONAL CITIZENS’ ADVISORY COUNCIL,
http://www.pwsrcac.org/about (last visited Apr. 22, 2012).
137 See Fikret Berkes et al., Collaborative Integrated Management in Canada’s North:
The Role of Local and Traditional Knowledge and Community-Based Monitoring, 35
COASTAL MGMT. 143, 147 (2007).
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BSIMPI is comprised of two bodies: the Senior Management
Committee and the Working Group. The BSIMPI Working Group is
mandated to plan and deliver integrated ocean management activities,
and link this work back to the communities. It is responsible for
holding public meetings and for ensuring that the local Hunters and
Trappers Committees, the Community Corporations which focus on
economic development, and Elders’ Committees are consulted and
given the opportunity to comment on BSIMPI activities at regular
intervals.138
Moreover, the North-American arrangements that this Section has
focused on thus far represent only one variation in how indigenous
communities are participating in land management in the Arctic.
Greenland Self-Rule, contrary to the devolution processes in Alaska
and Canada which either directly or indirectly led to the creation of
Inuit co-management regimes, has been a process, according to Frank
Sejersen, of state building rather than devolution. Within the political
capital of Nuuk, there is little discussion about co-management.139
Instead citizens participate in resource management though citizen
groups such as the Association of Fishermen and Hunters in
Greenland (“KNAPK”) or the Greenland Employers’ Association
(“GA”), (not totally unlike interest groups in the United States) which
represent their constituents and lobby the Greenlandic government to
enact policies in their favor.
When it comes to discussions around offshore oil and gas
specifically, local communities are involved through processes of
stakeholder dialogues (often taking place in Nuuk, where citizen
groups speak on behalf of community members) or consultation
processes where the companies involved in a project visit the
communities that will be affected. These visits are often viewed as
“explanations” to rather than consultations with local community
members. In the case of Greenland, community frustrations with
consultation processes includes feelings that the information provided

138

See id. at 149.
Frank Sejersen, Local Knowledge in Greenland: Arctic Perspectives and Contextual
Differences, in CULTIVATING ARCTIC LANDSCAPES: KNOWING AND MANAGING ANIMALS IN
THE CIRCUMPOLAR NORTH 33, 33-54 (D. Anderson & M. Nuttall eds., 2004). Greenland
attained Home Rule in 1979. In 2009, Greenland Home Rule was replaced by
Greenland Self Rule. A key component of the Self Rule legislation concerns
Greenland’s resources. While sovereign statehood was not sought, the new Self Rule
Government acquired the right to develop its subsurface minerals, which were
deemed to belong to Greenland. Thus, Greenland achieved total control over its
renewable and non-renewable resources. Id.
139
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is too technical, it fails to address the questions that are of importance
to the community members, there is not enough time to learn about
the project before the consultation, and community members are not
well enough informed beforehand for the meeting.140
Overall, the relationship between Arctic indigenous communities
and unconventional energy development is nuanced, which plays out
in these shared governance arrangements. For example, despite the
media focus on and litigation over the ways in which climate change is
disrupting traditional indigenous ways of life, a number of Inuit
communities also treat the greater accessibility to natural resources,
including offshore oil and gas, due to Arctic melting as a potential
opportunity. For those communities, resource development is viewed
as a means to improve standards of living and gain further economic
autonomy, which was reflected in the mixed reactions to the Shell Oil
pull out described in the Introduction.141 The May 2011 ICC
Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Resource Development Principles in
Inuit Nunaat, for instance, states that:
[r]esponsible non-renewable resource development can also
make an important and durable contribution to the well-being
of current and future generations of Inuit. Managed under
Inuit Nunaat governance structures, non-renewable resource
development can contribute to Inuit economic and social
development through both private sector channels
(employment, incomes, businesses) and public sector channels
(revenues from publicly owned lands, tax revenues,
infrastructure). . . . Inuit welcome the opportunity to work in
full partnership with resource developers, governments and
local communities in the sustainable development of resources
of Inuit Nunaat, including related policy-making, to the longlasting benefit of Inuit and with respect for baseline
environmental and social responsibilities.142

140 See Ilisimatusarfik University of Greenland Successfully Hosts Nation’s First Ever Oil
and Gas Key Stakeholder Dialogue, UARCTIC (Oct. 20, 2011), http://www.uarctic.
org/news/2011/10/ilisimatusarfikuniversity-of-greenland-successfully-hosts-nations-firstever-oil-and-gas-key-stakeholder-dialogue.
141 See supra INTRODUCTION.
142 ICC (INUIT CIRCUMPOLAR COUNCIL), A CIRCUMPOLAR INUIT DECLARATION ON
RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT PRINCIPLES IN INUIT NUNAAT (2011), available at http://www.
inuitcircumpolar.com/uploads/3/0/5/4/30542564/declaration_on_resource_development_
a3_final.pdf.
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At the same time, coastal Arctic indigenous communities such as
Inuit in Alaska, Canada, and Greenland, as well as Aleut (in Alaska
and Russia), often possess local/traditional knowledge needed to
establish where and when offshore development comes into contact
with Arctic mammal migration, fisheries, wildlife, and environmental
changes more generally. Their local knowledge and proximity
positions them to spot and participate in a response to an oil spill or
other incident (indigenous coastal communities also, by proximity,
could very well become first responders or the first contact on land as
the Coast Guard and other entities can be hours or days if not weeks
away, depending on weather conditions). Arctic indigenous coastal
communities are, in effect, the “boots on the ground” and, as such, are
already taking an active role in developing and participating in
emergency response (from being first responders to monitoring
problems or changes on and off shore in the Arctic to providing
shelter for stranded people).143
E. U.S. Regulation of Offshore Oil and Gas
For each of the Arctic states, a mix of public and private
transnational entities interacts with a domestic law system regulating
offshore drilling and oil spill responses. The U.S. approach, which is
evolving in response to the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill and growing
interest in the Arctic, exemplifies the complexities of domestic
regulation in this context. Moreover, as explored in Part III, federal
regulatory efforts, despite their apparently clear role as a site for
domestic national regulation, incorporate transnational governmental
and nongovernmental efforts at standard setting.
With respect to the regulation of the offshore drilling generally, U.S.
law provides a mix of federal and state authority.144 Depending on
how far from the coast drilling takes place, the federal and state
governments (in the case, Alaska) have regulatory roles based on the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”) and Coastal Zone
Management Act (“CZMA”).145 In addition, Alaska state contract law
143 See Jane George, Stranded Passengers Find Warmth in Kugluktuk, NUNATSIAQ
ONLINE (Aug. 30, 2010, 2:19 PM), http://www.nunatsiaqonline.ca/stories/article/
3008109_Stranded-passengers_crew_find_warm_welcome_in_Kugluktuk.
144 For Hari Osofsky’s in depth discussion of these governance structures and their
complex dynamics, see Osofsky, Multidimensional Governance, supra note 32, at 1084,
1086-87.
145 See Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451–1466 (2012); Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1356b (2012). Coastal states, with
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applies as federal law to the various subcontracting relationships
involved in the offshore drilling operations.146
Federal regulation of offshore drilling is largely promulgated and
enforced by the Department of the Interior (“DOI”) and the Coast
Guard.147 The Coast Guard oversees the platform level and DOI
regulates sub-platform drilling systems.148 The regulatory structure
within DOI has changed in response to the BP Deepwater Horizon spill;
Order 3299 separated leasing, environmental oversight, and money
collection through establishing Bureau of Ocean Energy Management
(“BOEM”); the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement
(“BSEE”); and the Office of Natural Resource Revenue.149 DOI
Secretary Salazar also established an Ocean Energy Safety Advisory
Committee, “a permanent advisory body of the nation’s leading
scientific, engineering, and technical experts who will provide critical
some exceptions not relevant to the Arctic context, have jurisdiction that extends to
three nautical miles from the shore at mean low tide. See 43 U.S.C. § 1337 (2012).
The dividing of state and federal authority over the submerged land offshore
contained in these statutes was first established under the Submerged Lands Act, ch.
65, 67 Stat. 29 (1953) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1315 (2012)). For
an analysis of how this regime evolved, see Rachael E. Salcido, Offshore Federalism and
Ocean Industrialization, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1355, 1375-96 (2008).
146 See 43 U.S.C. § 1333 (2012); Fruge ex rel. Fruge v. Parker Drilling Co., 337
F.3d 558, 560 (5th Cir. 2003) (“Federal jurisdiction is predicated on the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act (OSCLA) . . . [and] OCSLA adopts the law of the adjacent
state (Louisiana) as surrogate federal law, to the extent that it is not inconsistent with
other federal laws and regulations.” (citations omitted)). For an example of the
relevant Louisiana law, see LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4807(C) (2015) (“A subcontractor
is one who, by contract made directly with a contractor, or by a contract that is one of
a series of contracts emanating from a contractor, is bound to perform all or a part of a
work contracted for by the contractor.”).
147 See CURRY L. HAGERTY & JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41262,
DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL 13-17 (2010). For a discussion of the oil-spill response
command structure, see Nat’l Comm’n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill &
Offshore Drilling, Decision-Making Within the Unified Command 2 (Staff Working
Paper No. 2, 2011), available at http://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/oilspill/
20121211010432/http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Updated
%20Unified%20Command%20Working%20Paper.pdf.
148 HAGERTY & RAMSEUR, supra note 147, at 16.
149 See U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, SECRETARIAL ORDER NO. 3299, ESTABLISHMENT OF
THE BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MANAGEMENT, THE BUREAU OF SAFETY AND
ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT, AND THE OFFICE OF NATURAL RESOURCES REVENUE (May
19, 2010), available at http://elips.doi.gov/ELIPS/0/doc/444/Page1.aspx. For a
discussion of the ways in which outside review failed to catch problems with MMS
analysis and of how outside review could be more effective, see Holly Doremus,
Through Another’s Eyes: Getting the Benefit of Outside Perspectives in Environmental
Review, 38 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 247, 262-71, 272-79 (2011).
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guidance on improving offshore drilling safety, well containment, and
spill response.”150
In addition to this reorganization and institutional development, the
Obama Administration’s response to the Deepwater Horizon disaster
included rule revisions and development with respect to drilling and
worker safety. According to the BSEE, these include:
Enhanced Drilling Safety
• Operators must demonstrate that they are prepared to deal
with the potential for a blowout and worst-case discharge per
NTL-06.
• Permit applications for drilling projects must meet new
standards for well-design, casing, and cementing, and be
independently certified by a professional engineer per the new
Drilling Safety Rule. Drilling standards have been strengthened
in the exploration and development stages, for equipment,
safety practices, environmental safeguards, and oversight.
• New guidance, through NTL-10, requires a corporate
compliance statement and review of subsea blowout
containment resources for deepwater drilling, a key lesson of
the Deepwater Horizon oil spill.
• The bureau announced that they will begin to use multipleperson inspection teams for offshore oil and gas inspections.
This internal process improvement will improve oversight and
help ensure that offshore operations proceed safely and
responsibly. The new process will allow teams to inspect
multiple operations simultaneously and thoroughly, and
enhance the quality of inspections on larger facilities.

150 Salazar Names Members of Ocean Energy Safety Advisory Committee to Guide Oil and
Gas Regulatory Program Reform, U.S. DEP’T INTERIOR (Mar. 11, 2011), http://www.
doi.gov/news/pressreleases/Salazar-Names-Members-of-Ocean-Energy-Safety-AdvisoryCommittee-to-Guide-Oil-and-Gas-Regulatory-Program-Reform.cfm; see also Ocean Energy
Safety Advisory Committee, Notice of Meeting, 76 Fed. Reg. 18,232 (Apr. 1, 2011);
Establishment of the Ocean Energy Safety Advisory Committee, 76 Fed. Reg. 4,128 (Jan.
24, 2011); Ocean Energy Safety Advisory Committee, BUREAU SAFETY & ENVTL.
ENFORCEMENT, http://www.bsee.gov/about-bsee/public-Engagement/OESC/Index/ (last
visited Jan. 1, 2016); BUREAU OF SAFETY & ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR,
OCEAN ENERGY SAFETY ADVISORY COMMITTEE CHARTER (Jan. 30, 2013), available at
http://www.bsee.gov/uploadedFiles/BSEE/About_BSEE/Public_Engagement/Ocean_
Energy_Safety_Advisory_Committee/2011OceanEnergySafetyAdvisoryCommitteeCharter.
pdf.
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Enhanced Workplace Safety
• BSEE imposed, for the first time, requirements that offshore
operators maintain comprehensive safety and environmental
programs. This includes performance-based standards for
offshore drilling and production operations, including
equipment, safety practices, environmental safeguards, and
management oversight of operations and contractors.
Companies will now have to develop and maintain a Safety
and Environmental Management System (“SEMS”) per the
new Workplace Safety Rule.151
In April 2015, BSEE supplemented these efforts by proposing a new
blowout preventer rule to address the issues that arose with that
technology during the spill, which Section III.B.3 discusses in depth.152
Beyond this broadly focused rulemaking, the post-spill reassessment
— combined with (1) the push to explore increasingly accessible
Arctic oil and gas and (2) concerns raised by environmental groups
and some Alaska Native groups — caused the Obama Administration
to decide to promulgate drilling regulations specifically focused on
mobile offshore drilling units (“MODUs”) in the planning areas of the
Arctic Chukchi and Beaufort Seas.153 The rule proposed in February
2015 would ensure that each operator:
1. Designs and conducts exploration programs in a manner
suitable for Arctic OCS [Outer Continental Shelf] conditions;
2. Develops an integrated operations plan (IOP) that would
address all phases of its proposed Arctic OCS exploration
program and submit the IOP to DOI, acting through its
designee, BOEM, at least 90 days in advance of filing the
Exploration Plan (EP);

151 Regulatory Reform, BUREAU SAFETY & ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT, http://www.bsee.
gov/About-BSEE/BSEE-History/Reforms/Reforms/ (last visited Jan. 1, 2016) (emphasis
omitted).
152 See Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf — Blowout
Preventer Systems and Well Control, 80 Fed. Reg. 21504 (proposed Apr. 13, 2015) (to be
codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 250), available at http://www.bsee.gov/uploadedFiles/
BSEE/Regulations_and_Guidance/Recently_Finalized_Rules/Well_Control_Rule/BSEE%20
2015-08587%20Final%20FR%2004-13-15.pdf [hereinafter Blowout Preventer Rule].
153 See Arctic Drilling Rule, supra note 8.
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3. Has access to, and the ability to promptly deploy, Source
Control and Containment Equipment (SCCE) while drilling
below, or working below, the surface casing;
4. Has access to a separate relief rig located so that it could
timely drill a relief well in the event of a loss of well control
under the conditions expected at the site;
5. Has the capability to predict, track, report, and respond to
ice conditions and adverse weather events;
6. Effectively manages and oversees contractors; and
7. Develops and implements an Oil Spill Response Plan
(OSRP) that is designed and executed in a manner suitable for
the unique Arctic OCS operating environment and has the
necessary equipment, training, and personnel for oil spill
response on the Arctic OCS.154
As discussed in more depth in Section III.C, both this rule and the
new blowout preventer rule reflect the hybrid quality of governance in
this context by including standards from transnational standard
setting entities and approaches from the Arctic Council.155
Although the new rules described previously include disaster
planning, the response and spill liability regimes are largely constituted
separately from efforts to regulate offshore drilling to prevent disaster.
The federal government responds to major oil spills, such as the BP
Deepwater Horizon spill, through the National Oil and Hazardous
Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, often referred to as the National
Contingency Plan (“NCP”). Several laws help to establish the NCP: the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980 (“CERCLA”) as amended by the Superfund Amendments
and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (“SARA”), the Clean Water Act
(“CWA”), and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (“OPA”).156
154

Id. at 5.
See infra Part III.C.
40 C.F.R. § 300.2 (2015). The National Contingency Plan:

155
156

The NCP is required by section 105 of the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9605, as
amended by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986
(SARA), Pub. L. 99–499, (hereinafter CERCLA), and by section 311(d) of
the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(d), as amended by the Oil
Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA), Pub. L. 101–380. In Executive Order (E.O.)
12777 (56 FR 54757, October 22, 1991), the President delegated to the
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The NCP, as written, sets up a federally-controlled approach to the
response with opportunities for involvement and input by key state
actors. The NCP establishes a national response team of fifteen key
federal departments and agencies, as well as regional response teams
that include state and local government representatives.157 An OnScene Coordinator leads this response effort under a unified command
system.158 However, the on-the-ground reality during the BP
Deepwater Horizon spill response was far more complex, as smaller
interagency groupings addressed specific issues, such as fisheries and
dispersants, and state and local governments took independent action
at times.159
In addition to addressing the response, the OPA, paired with the
CWA and other environmental law, establishes a federal framework
for oil spill liability. However, it does not preempt similar state laws160
and a number of states have established their own similar liability
laws, often referred to as mini-OPAs.161
The long-term spill response to the BP Deepwater Horizon spill
exemplifies the administrative complexity that would arise in the
United States if a major spill took place in U.S. Arctic waters. The
official government website on that spill includes fifteen federal
partners in the response: Corporation for National and Community
Service, Department of Agriculture, Department of Defense,
Department of Energy, Department of Homeland Security, Department
of the Interior, Department of Justice, Department of Labor,
Environmental Protection Agency, Health and Human Services,
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, National Oceanic and

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) the responsibility for the
amendment of the NCP. Amendments to the NCP are coordinated with
members of the National Response Team (NRT) prior to publication for
notice and comment. This includes coordination with the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission in order to avoid inconsistent or duplicative requirements in
the emergency planning responsibilities of those agencies. The NCP is
applicable to response actions taken pursuant to the authorities under
CERCLA and section 311 of the CWA, as amended.
Id.
157

See id. §§ 300.105(c), .110(a), .175(b) (2015).
See id. § 300.105(c), (d).
159 See Osofsky, Multidimensional Governance, supra note 32, at 1091-93, 1095.
160 33 U.S.C. § 2718 (2012).
161 For an analysis of these “state mini-OPAs,” see Stanley A. Millan, Escaping the
“Black Hole” in the Gulf, 24 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 41, 66-67 (2010).
158
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Atmospheric Administration, Small Business Administration, Research
and Innovative Technology Administration, and the White House.162
These entities work collaboratively with a focus on thirteen areas of
response and recovery: administration, assistance, data/energy,
environment, food, health, investigation, military, travel, volunteer,
weather, wildlife, and workers.163 Moreover, in the context of the
Arctic, more significant transnational issues may arise given the
likelihood of a spill traveling into transnational waters, especially
those of Russia and Canada.
The many governance arrangements described in this Part — which
span levels of government and involve both public and private
authorities and stakeholders — provide a dilemma for those trying to
improve Arctic offshore oil and gas regulation. Namely, they are
diverse and diffuse, and could not be supplanted easily by some
overarching governmental agreement. Effective next steps need to take
the many relevant entities and their roles into account, which
constrains simple solutions. The next Part focuses on nascent efforts
to create needed interconnections among these entities, which can
serve as a basis for further collaboration.
III. EMERGING HYBRID COOPERATION
The previous Part explores the diversity of governance arrangements
relevant to offshore oil and gas regulation in the Arctic. This Part
analyzes the implications of that diversity for cooperation in disaster
prevention and response. It focuses in particular on the hybridity —
mixed public/private character — of most of the entities addressing oil
and gas development to propose the value of what it terms “hybrid
cooperation” in this and other complex governance contexts. As noted
in the introduction, this form of cooperation involves diverse
stakeholders at multiple levels of government combining their efforts
either through creating institutions that bring them together or
through integrating each other’s work in the agreements and
regulations that they develop.
This Part begins in Section A by defining the concept of “hybrid
cooperation.” Sections B and C then provide case examples of ways in
162 See Federal Partners by Agency A–Z, RESTORETHEGULF, https://www.restorethegulf.
gov/coast-guard-response/national-response-team/federal-partners-agency-z (last visited
Jan. 1, 2016).
163 See
Federal Partners by Topic A–Z, RESTORETHEGULF, https://www.
restorethegulf.gov/coast-guard-response/national-response-team/federal-partners-topic-z
(last visited Feb. 18, 2016).
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which that cooperation appears in regulatory approaches and
institutions. The Part concludes with an assessment of the benefits and
limitations of hybrid cooperation in the Arctic offshore drilling context.
A. Defining Hybrid Cooperation
In order to provide a meaningful analysis of the role of hybrid
cooperation in Arctic energy governance, we must first explain what
we mean by that term. Such a definition is complicated, however, by
the many forms that hybrid arrangements take and the overlapping
but not identical analyses of these kinds of arrangements in the
scholarly literature. For instance, polycentric governance,164 global
legal pluralism,165 the New Haven School,166 global administrative
164 Polycentric governance approaches similarly engage the multi-level, multiactor, mixed formal and formal governance dynamics that dominate the Arctic oil and
gas context. For example, according to political scientist Jan Aart Scholte:

governance now also involves suprastate (regional and transworld) regimes
that operate with some autonomy from the state. In addition, many substate
(municipal and provincial) governments today engage directly with spheres
beyond their state . . . governance . . . has become distinctly multi-layered
and cross-cutting. Regulation occurs at — and through interconnections
among — municipal, provincial, national, regional and global sites . . . .
Thus in polycentric circumstances no site or level of governance has oneway sway over the others.
J.A. Scholte, Globalization and Governance: From Statism to Polycentrism 3, 21 (Ctr. for
the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation, Working Paper No. 130/04, 2004).
Elinor Ostrom, Dan Cole, and Hari Osofsky, among others, have applied these ideas of
polycentric governance in the context of climate change. Elinor Ostrom’s 2009 World
Bank Research Working Paper, in particular, helped open a broader conversation
about the need to acknowledge the significance of a wide range of formal and informal
action beyond the confines of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change. See Elinor Ostrom, A Polycentric Approach for Coping with Climate Change
(World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 5095, 2009). For an example of
scholarship building on this approach, see Daniel H. Cole, From Global to Polycentric
Climate Governance (European Univ. Inst. Robert Schuman Ctr. for Advanced Studies,
Working Paper No. 2011/30, 2011), available at https://www.researchgate.net/
publication/228147855_From_Global_to_Polycentric_Climate_Governance.
165 Global legal pluralism explores the multiple normative, and sometimes legal,
communities operating in shared social space and the navigation of simultaneously
valid orders. For examples of this approach in a variety of substantive contexts, see
Robert B. Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 863 (2006); Diane Marie
Amann, Calling Children to Account: The Proposal for a Juvenile Chamber in the Special
Court for Sierra Leone, 29 PEPP. L. REV. 167 (2001); Diane Marie Amann, Current
Debates in the Conflict of Laws: Application of the Constitution to Guantanamo Bay: Abu
Ghraib, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2085 (2005); Elena A. Baylis, Parallel Courts in Post-Conflict
Kosovo, 32 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2007); Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S.
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law,167 network theory,168 and reconceptualizations of globalization169
and indigeneity170 treat a diverse set of multilevel activity as relevant
CAL. L. REV. 1155 (2007); William W. Burke-White, International Legal Pluralism, 25
MICH. J. INT’L L. 963 (2004); Janet Koven Levit, A Bottom-Up Approach to International
Lawmaking: The Tale of Three Trade Finance Instruments, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 125 (2005);
Ralf Michaels, The Re-state-ment of Non-State Law: The State, Choice of Law, and the
Challenge from Global Legal Pluralism, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 1209 (2005). For Hari
Osofsky’s examination of pluralism in the context of climate change litigation, see
Hari M. Osofsky, Climate Change Litigation as Pluralist Legal Dialogue?, 26 STAN.
ENVTL. L.J. 181 (2007) [hereinafter Climate Change]. For an exploration of property
rights in the context of legal pluralism, see Ruth S. Meinzen-Dick & Rajendra
Pradhan, Legal Pluralism and Dynamic Property Rights (Int’l Food Policy Research
Inst., CAPRi Working Paper No. 22, 2002), available at http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/
dlc/handle/10535/4231.
166 The New Haven School treats law as “a process of authoritative decision by
which the members of a community clarify and secure their common interests.”
HAROLD D. LASSWELL & MYRES S. MCDOUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY:
STUDIES IN LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY, at xxi (1992); accord Myres S. McDougal et al.,
The World Community: A Planetary Social Process, 21 UC DAVIS L. REV. 807, 810-11
(1988). For a discussion of the New Haven School’s goals, see LASSWELL & MCDOUGAL,
supra, at xxix. Ideas of new governance and polycentric governance share much in
common with a variety of interdisciplinary approaches to legal pluralism, which in
turn have much in common with the New Haven School, in that they all have a broad
conception of lawmaking that incorporates a diverse set of activity. See Osofsky,
Climate Change, supra note 165, at 184. Under such models, the wide range of
activities trying to establish unconventional energy standards can be treated as part of
a lawmaking process that also incorporates formal treaty processes and accompanying
national legislation and regulation.
167 For an analysis of key principles of global administrative law, see Benedict
Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
15 (2005).
168 Considerable scholarly literature across several disciplines explores the role of
networks in governance, which is relevant to this context because many of the key
stakeholders in the Arctic relate to one another through a variety of networks. For
instance, the intersection of international law, international relations, and
transgovernmentalism examines how relationships among a range of governmental
and nongovernmental entities shape international governance. Anne-Marie Slaughter’s
A New World Order, for example, describes vertical and horizontal networks of
governmental officials interacting with one another and with disaggregated
international organizations. See ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 18-23
(2004). At the intersection of urban studies and geography, Saskia Sassen has explored
how economic globalization and the emergence of new information and
communication technologies have established world cities as key nodes for crossborder networks and resource concentration. See Saskia Sassen, Locating Cities on
Global Circuits, 14 ENV’T & URBANIZATION 13 (2002), available at http://eau.sagepub.
com/content/14/1/13.full.pdf. In the political geography scale literature, Kevin Cox
has argued that different scales are themselves networks, focusing in particular on
local spaces as comprised both of core local interactions and multi-level ones. See
Kevin R. Cox, Spaces of Dependence, Spaces of Engagement and the Politics of Scale, or:
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Looking for Local Politics, 17 POL. GEOGRAPHY 1, 2 (1998). At the intersection of law
and anthropology, Annelise Riles has described the role of multilevel networks as
Fijian activists and bureaucrats prepared for and then participated in the United
Nations Fourth World Conference on Women. See ANNELISE RILES, THE NETWORK
INSIDE OUT (2000). Hari Osofsky, using a law and geography approach, has considered
the role of networks of cities in climate change governance. See, e.g., Hari M. Osofsky,
Multiscalar Governance and Climate Change: Reflections on the Role of States and Cities
at Copenhagen, 25 MD. J. INT’L L. 64 (2010); Hari M. Osofsky, Rethinking the Geography
of Local Climate Action: Multilevel Network Participation in Metropolitan Regions, 2015
UTAH L. REV. 173 [hereinafter Rethinking]; Hari M. Osofsky, Suburban Climate Change
Efforts: Possibilities for Small and Nimble Cities Participating in State, Regional, National,
and International Networks, 22 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 395 (2012); Hari M. Osofsky
& Janet Koven Levit, The Scale of Networks?: Local Climate Change Coalitions, 8 CHI. J.
INT’L L. 409 (2008). While each of these accounts has a distinct focus and orientation,
a common thread running through them is their analysis of the way in which
interactions at multiple levels both inside and outside of the formal confines of law
formation help to constitute governance.
169 A number of political scientists, geographers, legal scholars, and sociologists
rethink traditional notions of sovereignty and the state as the center of analysis. See,
e.g., JENS BARTLESON, A GENEALOGY OF SOVEREIGNTY (1995); STATE SOVEREIGNTY AS
SOCIAL CONSTRUCT (Thomas J. Biersteker & Cynthia Weber eds., 1996); John Agnew,
Sovereignty Regimes: Territoriality and State Authority in Contemporary World Politics,
95 ANNALS ASSOC. AM. GEOGRAPHERS 437 (2005); Mathias Albert & Lothar Brock,
What Keeps the Westphalia Together? Normative Differentiation in the Modern System of
States, in IDENTITIES, BORDERS, ORDERS: RETHINKING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY
29 (Mathias Albert et al. eds., 2001); Noel Castree, Differential Geographies: Place,
Indigenous Rights and “Local” Resources, 23 POL. GEOGRAPHY 133 (2004). Some of these
analyses focus on multilevel governance. See MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE (Ian Bache &
Matthew Flinders, eds. 2004).
170 For instance, geographer Noel Castree has looked at how indigenous groups
have constructed new ways of thinking about political relationships to land that go
beyond traditional considerations of state sovereignty. See Castree, supra note 169, at
156. According to Castree, indigeneity is “both a reaction to and an embrace of
translocal connectivity . . . or [globalization].” Id. (emphasis omitted). International
Relations (“IR”) scholar Jessica Shadian likewise contends that traditional notions of
Westphalian sovereignty — in which sovereign and equal nation states create
international law through binding agreements — are now ceding space to newer ideas
of quasi non-state sovereignty. The Inuit through the Inuit Circumpolar Council
(“ICC”), for instance, have attained a form of cultural sovereignty (i.e. cultural
integrity), rather than state sovereignty (territorial integrity), affording Inuit the
authority to participate formally in global politics. See SHADIAN, ARCTIC SOVEREIGNTY,
supra note 67, at 12-16, 196; Jessica Shadian, From States to Polities: Reconceptualizing
Sovereignty Through Inuit Governance, 16 EUROPEAN J. INT’L REL. 485, 493 (2010). IR
theorist Karena Shaw also focuses on the impact of indigenous politics on our
traditional understandings of sovereignty and the state. According to Shaw,
indigenous struggles are our problems, not because they are our fault, but because of
the implications those struggles have for understanding our own identities. Karena
Shaw, Indigeneity and the International, 31 MILLENNIUM: J. INT’L REL. STUD. 55, 58-59
(2002). If we want to understand current world politics, Shaw argues, and so “shift
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to lawmaking processes. New governance,171 regulatory institutions,172
and adaptive management173 theories explore mechanisms for
[our] exploration of the diverse spatial, temporal, and discursive conditions under
which forms of authority are being constituted, enabled and authorised today,” then
we need to move the center of our analysis from ontologically given assumptions
about authority to the ontological conditions of possibility. See id. at 79. Legal scholar
Natalia Loukacheva has written about the legalities of the Inuit land claims
agreements. According to her, they are creating new conceptions of autonomy that she
refers to as “constitutional hybrids.” See NATALIA LOUKACHEVA, THE ARCTIC PROMISE:
LEGAL AND POLITICAL AUTONOMY OF GREENLAND AND NUNAVUT 145 (2007); see also
Marshall Beier, Forgetting, Remembering, and Finding Indigenous Peoples in International
Relations, in INDIGENOUS DIPLOMACIES 11 (J. Marshall Beier., ed., 2009).
171 New governance scholars have written — most relevantly — about ways to
reconceptualize the traditional practices of environmental regulation and natural
resource management to meet the changing nature of resource rights, ownership, and
use. Rather than relying upon traditional top-down regulatory models, these scholars
focus on the need to take into account the various levels of governance and
multiplicity of stakeholders. Professors Kenneth W. Abbot and Duncan Snidal have
outlined four core attributes of new governance approaches across various substantive
contexts: (1) state-orchestrated instead of state-centered; (2) decentralized instead of
centralized; (3) based on dispersed instead of bureaucratic expertise; and (4)
integrating a mixture of hard and soft law instead of focusing only on mandatory
rules. See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Strengthening International Regulation
Through Transnational New Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit, 42 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 501, 508-09 (2009). For additional examples of new governance
scholarship, see LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US (Gráinne de Búrca
& Joanne Scott eds., 2006); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Reply, “New Governance” in Legal
Thought and in the World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN.
L. REV. 471 (2004) [hereinafter New Governance]; Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall
of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L.
REV. 342 (2004); Orly Lobel, Surreply, Setting the Agenda for New Governance Research,
89 MINN. L. REV. 498 (2004); J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones,
and Massive Problems in the Administrative State: A Guide for Whittling Away, 98 CALIF.
L. REV. 59 (2010). According to Bradley Karkkainen, who has developed new
governance approaches in an environmental context most relevant here, the
traditional model of environmental protection which materialized in the 1960s
assumes that an expert decision maker — the regulatory agency which was an arm of
the state — would identify the most important environmental problems, gather
sufficient expert information to specify effective solutions, express those solutions as a
series of specific legally binding commands, and finally enforce those commands by
employing the coercive sanctioning power of the state. See Karkkainen, New
Governance, supra, at 473-74. Jessica Shadian explains that new governance
approaches to resource management also aim to deal with the fact that often resource
management is controlled equally by states and various non-state actors including
private companies. Shadian further recognizes:
that the competences of varying actors are multilayered among missionspecific agencies and are dispersed over various tiers of government.
. . . Non-state actors . . . are not considered merely as stakeholders, or
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developing more inclusive, responsive, and decentralized governance
approaches. Dynamic federalism174 also analyzes the development and
structures of multilevel governance, generally in more domestic
contexts. We draw in particular from a conception of hybrid
governance that Hari Osofsky developed with Hannah Wiseman in the
U.S. domestic energy context, though modified somewhat to reflect
the particular characteristics of the Arctic.175 Although these
conceptualizations vary significantly from one another, they all
consultants, epistemic communities or lobbyists to the sovereign authority
(for example a federal or city government). [Rather, they comprise part of
the governance arrangement.] The state, as such, is often forced to engage
“in an open-ended effort at collaborative problem-solving” with non-state
actors in order to utilize their expertise and resources.
Jessica M. Shadian, Of Whales and Oil: Inuit Resource Governance and the Arctic Council,
49 POLAR REC. 392, 394 (2013) [hereinafter Of Whales and Oil] (citation omitted).
172 For examples of regulatory institutions theory, see Valerie Braithwaite, Ten
Things You Need to Know About Regulation and Never Wanted to Ask, 14 AUSTL. L. LIBR.
19 (2006); Charlotte Wood et al., Applications of Responsive Regulatory Theory in
Australia and Overseas (Reg. Inst. Network, Occasional Paper No. 15, 2010), available
at http://regnet.anu.edu.au/research/publications/3097/no-15-applications-responsiveregulatory-theory-australia-and-overseas.
173 Adaptive management, at times drawing from concepts of panarchy, see C.S.
Holling et al., In Quest of a Theory of Adaptive Change, in PANARCHY: UNDERSTANDING
TRANSFORMATIONS IN HUMAN AND NATURAL SYSTEMS 3, 5 (Lance H. Gunderson & C.S.
Holling eds., 2002), explores how law can be structured to allow for regulatory
evolution in response to change. See, e.g., Alejandro E. Camacho, Assisted Migration:
Redefining Nature and Natural Resource Law Under Climate Change, 27 YALE J. ON REG.
171 (2010); Robin Kundis Craig, “Stationarity Is Dead” — Long Live Transformation:
Five Principles for Climate Change Adaptation Law, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 9 (2010);
Michael Ilg, Complexity, Environment, and Equitable Competition: A Theory of Adaptive
Rule Design, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 647 (2010); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Default Rules in
Private and Public Law: Extending Default Rules Beyond Purely Economic Relationships:
Information-Forcing Environmental Regulation, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 861 (2006); J.B.
Ruhl & Robert L. Fischman, Adaptive Management in the Courts, 95 MINN. L. REV. 424
(2010); J.B. Ruhl, Law’s Complexity: A Primer, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 885 (2008); Sandra
Zellmer, Essay, A Tale of Two Imperiled Rivers: Reflections from a Post-Katrina World,
59 FLA. L. REV. 599 (2007).
174 In the U.S. domestic law context, an extensive and rapidly growing dynamic
federalism literature complements this scholarship through its analysis of how to
structure appropriate and effective multi-level governance structures. See Kirsten H.
Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law, 56 EMORY
L.J. 159, 160 (2006). For Hari Osofsky’s extensive summary and synthesis of this
literature in the context of climate change, see Hari M. Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism
and Climate Change: Implications for the Obama Administration, 62 ALA. L. REV. 237,
269-72, 276, 281 (2011).
175 See Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, Hybrid Energy Governance, 2014 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1, 1-2.
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develop multipolar governance models that include a wide range of
stakeholders, which we view as crucial for the Arctic context, given its
governance complexity.
This Article builds on these theories and the earlier work of Osofsky
and Wiseman to develop a conceptual approach for what we term
“hybrid cooperation.” Hybrid cooperation focuses on how a variety of
public and private stakeholders — including indigenous peoples and
corporations, among others — are actively contributing to new norms
and governance structures for Arctic offshore drilling. We focus in
particular on three key characteristics that we treat as fundamental to
hybrid cooperation:
(1) Hybrid cooperation involves more than one type of key
stakeholder.
Hybrid cooperation, whether in the text of a regulation or in the
form of an agreement, involves multiple key actors relying on one
another or interacting with one another in some fashion. Involving
more than one key stakeholder is crucial to hybrid cooperation serving
as a mechanism for addressing fragmentation.
(2) Hybrid cooperation bridges the public-private divide.
In order to be hybrid in this model, regulations or institutions must
involve both public (or at least quasi-public) and private actors. In
most instances, they include some mix of governmental and corporate
entities. In one instance, they involve governmentally constituted
Alaska Native corporations and transnational corporations.
(3) Hybrid cooperation creates new alignment or coordination.
Hybrid cooperation does not require explicitly cooperative behavior,
but it must create progress in entities working in a coordinated fashion,
whether that entails using one another’s standards or actually working
together. This requirement helps to ensure that regulations and
institutions categorized in this way actually move cooperation forward.
What sets our idea of hybrid cooperation apart from much of the
above scholarly literature is that many of those writings focus on
decentralized institutions and processes that include a wide range of
stakeholders, without considering regulatory incorporation.176
Similarly, the scholarship on regulatory incorporation does not tend to
focus as much on institution building.177 We argue that a more
inclusive view of hybrid cooperation that includes both forms provides
176
177

See supra notes 161–67 and accompanying text.
See id.
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an important mechanism for developing systematic strategies for
addressing the governance fragmentation in the Arctic offshore
drilling context. The Article adds to the literature on hybrid
governance in creating a model of hybrid cooperation that includes
not only emerging institutions that bring together non-state actors and
varying levels of governments, but also regulatory developments that
incorporate rules, regulations, and standards of other entities
(standard setting organizations, regional regimes, indigenous legal
infrastructures, domestic law, etc.). The following diagram illustrates
these two primary categories of hybrid cooperation we examine in the
paper, organized from strongest to weakest levels of cooperation.

Regulatory
Incorporation

Institutional
Collaboration

Document uses specific
standards created by a
stakeholder entity

Collaborative participation
processes that result in joint
action

Document references standards
created by a stakeholder entity

Mechanisms for
stakeholders to have
meaningful input

Document references the need
to involve a stakeholder

Consultation with
stakeholders

The sections that follow examine several examples to illustrate how
hybrid cooperation is working in practice. Although these two
categories are not entirely distinct — regulatory incorporation can
create institutions, for example — we have grouped them by what we
view as the dominant form that they represent. For regulatory
incorporation, Section III.B considers the Arctic Council’s 2015
Framework Plan for Cooperation on Prevention of Oil Pollution from
Petroleum and Maritime Activities in the Marine Areas of the Arctic,
and PAME’s 2014 Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines: System
Safety Management and Safety Culture. The section also dissects the
Obama Administration’s 2015 proposed Requirements for Exploratory
Drilling on the Arctic Outer Continental Shelf and proposed blowout
preventer regulations. Each of these developments provides examples
of strong regulatory incorporation, in which standards created by
industry organizations or standard setting bodies are directly
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incorporated into the documents. The section also highlights the
Obama Administration’s inclusion of Arctic Council approaches in its
Arctic drilling regulations, and efforts across the documents to
reference the involvement of key stakeholders.178
With respect to institutional collaboration, Section III.C considers
three examples: the Arctic Inupiat Offshore, LCC (“AIO”), Regional
Citizens Advisory Councils (“RCACs”), and the Arctic Waterways
Safety Committee (“AWSC”). AIO is a new company that brought
together Alaska Native corporations, the Arctic Slope Regional
Corporation and six North Slope village corporations in anticipation
of Shell Oil’s Chukchi Sea drilling project. Shell Oil and AIO “entered
into a binding agreement that will allow AIO the option to acquire an
interest in Shell’s acreage and activities on its Chukchi Sea leases. This
interest will be managed by AIO.”179 The agreement largely focuses on
shared economic benefits, but also provides opportunities for Alaska
Native input into resource management in this context. Although this
particular collaboration is obviously significantly undermined in the
near term by Shell Oil’s decision to pull out of the Chukchi Sea, it
provides an interesting model for collaboration between Alaska Native
corporations and transnational oil and gas corporations. The other two
examples involve federally-created entities that bring stakeholders
together to provide input into safety. RCACs were formed in the
aftermath of the Exxon Valdez spill, and focus on spill prevention and
responses in two communities. AWSC was constituted by the Coast
Guard, and allows diverse stakeholders to provide input into waterway
transport safety.180
The Article’s approach acknowledges that cooperation is not always
achieved through explicit agreements among key stakeholders, in part
because there is simply too much simultaneous activity for full
coordination and in part because the existing governmental structures
often limit participation. The participatory processes taking place
under the auspices of the Arctic Council, described in Section III.B.1,
are the closest to the fullest form of hybrid cooperation in the Arctic
offshore oil and gas contexts. Although the Arctic Council gives
greater status to nation-states than other participants, its working
groups often involve private actors and they always involve the six

178

See infra Part III.B.
Press Release, Arctic Slope Reg’l Corp., ASRC, North Slope Village Corporations and
Shell Announce Historic Venture (July 31, 2014) [hereinafter ASRC Press Release],
available at http://www.asrc.com/PressReleases/Pages/Arctic-Inupiat-Offshore.aspx.
180 See infra Part III.C.3.
179
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permanent indigenous representatives.181 Even there, though, the
proceedings do not fully encapsulate the many activities described in
Part II and all of the key actors.182
Moreover, the multi-stakeholder processes at the Arctic Council
represent only a small fraction of the diverse types of collaboration
emerging in the Arctic, a few of which are explored by this Part. These
individual examples of hybrid cooperation are important because they
collectively help to constitute more integrated regional governance
amid complexity and fragmentation. In the context of Arctic offshore
energy governance, we are witnessing the early onset and creation of
new norms for offshore oil and gas development. These norms are
being structured by Arctic Council efforts, pre-existing domestic laws,
Arctic regional-level knowledge exchange regarding these domestic
rules and procedures, U.S. and global responses by governmental,
inter-governmental, and nongovernmental entities to the BP Deepwater
Horizon disaster and the earlier Exxon Valdez spill, and broader
transitions in the energy system and in understandings of the Arctic.183

181

See supra Part II.B.
Working Group Management Boards generally include representatives from Arctic
Members States’ national governmental agencies and Permanent Participant
representatives. Working Groups, ARCTIC COUNCIL, http://www.arctic-council.org/
index.php/en/about-us/working-groups (last updated Sept. 10, 2015). Representative of
observer states and organizations participate to some extent, as do invited experts and
guests. Id. In addition, the Permanent Participant structure does not provide full
representation of Arctic indigenous peoples. Although the Ottawa Declaration establishing
the Arctic Council allows for additional Permanent Participants, it requires that these
“organizations of Arctic indigenous peoples” have a “majority Arctic indigenous
constituency” that either represents “a single indigenous people resident in more than one
Arctic state” or “more than one Arctic indigenous people resident in a single Arctic state.”
Arctic Council, Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council, Ottawa, Canada,
Sept. 19, 1996, art. 2, available at https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/
11374/85/00_ottawa_decl_1996_signed%20%284%29.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
These requirements mean that it would be difficult for all Arctic indigenous peoples with
their diversity of viewpoints will be fully represented through the Permanent Participant
structure. For an analysis of participation gaps faced by indigenous peoples in international
law and the extent to which the Permanent Participant structure serves as a model, see
Timo Koivurova & Leena Heinämäki, The Participation of Indigenous Peoples in
International Norm-making in the Arctic, 42 POLAR RECORD 101 (2006).
183 Generally speaking, the Arctic is increasingly understood as a political rather
than solely physical region. This emerging understanding includes the recognition
that the Arctic is inhabited by many indigenous and other communities, and
accompanying that recognition is the fact that there are many well-established
governance mechanisms already in place. SHADIAN, ARCTIC SOVEREIGNTY, supra note
67, at 85-88, 196.
182
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The following sections demonstrate how hybrid cooperation has been
operationalized at multiple scales and in different contexts. The case
studies demonstrate that fundamentally fragmented governance
structures in the Arctic offshore drilling context may be mitigated by
these types of regulatory approaches and institutions. Although each
example represents only one aspect of regulatory governance in this
context, they collectively provide models for how greater cooperation
can be achieved moving forward. The examples described in the
following sections thus form part of a mosaic of hybrid Arctic energy
“cooperations” — a developing, interconnected web-like governance
system where no one authority dominates.184 A nascent regional
governance approach is emerging as multiple institutions begin
simultaneously to create regulations and varying forms of soft law (from
best practices and standards to recommendations) and these regulations
and soft law tools themselves directly borrow from one another.
B. Regulatory Incorporation
This section explores three examples of transnational and national
regulatory efforts including standards by or inclusion of other key
stakeholders. The first involves cooperation built into Arctic Council
documents regarding offshore oil and gas safety. The second two
consider ways in which federal regulations emerging with respect to
offshore drilling generally and in the Arctic context in particular
incorporate efforts by transnational entities and standard setting
bodies. The incorporation of these participatory processes and public
and private transnational regulatory mechanisms exemplifies the mix
of explicit and implicit cooperation being built into regional planning
and domestic laws in this context.
1.

Arctic Council Framework Plan and Working Group Guidelines

The Arctic Council, as discussed in Part II, provides numerous ways
for key actors to participate, especially through permanent participant
status for representatives of indigenous peoples and the working
groups. These opportunities do not generally include, though, direct
participation by specific local indigenous communities, or other Arctic
184 The idea of a mosaic is borrowed from Oran Young 2005. Not referring
specifically to offshore oil and gas development, Young’s article discusses the postCold War regional governance changes in the Arctic which he refers to as an emerging
mosaic. See Oran R. Young, Governing the Arctic: From Cold War Theater to Mosaic of
Cooperation, 11 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 9, 9-10 (2005).
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subnational regions, governments, or institutions. However, in the
Arctic Council’s latest efforts to cooperate in the area of preventing oil
pollution disasters through the 2015 Framework Plan for Cooperation
on Prevention of Oil Pollution from Petroleum and Maritime Activities
in the Marine Areas of the Arctic (“2015 Framework Plan”), there is a
more concerted effort to include key stakeholders.
The recognition of the hybrid quality of efforts to address offshore
drilling safety begins with the declarations at the beginning of the
plan. A series of declarations acknowledges the important roles of the
International
Maritime
Organization;
“indigenous
peoples,
communities, and local and regional authorities”; several Arctic
Council working groups that include diverse stakeholders; “the World
Meteorological Organization; the International Hydrographic
Organization, specifically, the Arctic Regional Hydrographic
Commission;
and
the
Intergovernmental
Oceanographic
Commission.”185 The agreement reinforces its incorporation of key
actors in its statement of its objective: “to strengthen cooperation,
including exchange of information, among the Participants in the field
of prevention of marine oil pollution in order to protect the Arctic
marine environment.”186
More importantly, these key actors are also integrated into the
implementation provisions. For example, in Section 1.6.2, the
Framework Plan explicitly focuses on private sector cooperation: “The
Participants intend — where possible, and in accordance with their
national legislation (laws and regulations) and, as appropriate, policies
— to cooperate with the private sector in order to improve standards
and best practices for the prevention of the pollution of the Arctic
marine environment by oil.”187 In numerous sections, the Framework
Plan references standard setting and the need to cooperate and assess
standards, which at times explicitly mentions “industry standards.”188
The 2015 Framework Plan builds on the ongoing efforts of the
PAME working group, which involves a broader group of stakeholders
in its processes than the Council meetings themselves. As discussed in
Part II, PAME has been developing offshore oil and gas safety
guidelines for a number of years. Its 2014 Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas
Guidelines: System Safety Management and Safety Culture (“2014
Guidelines”) contain numerous provisions that involve cooperation
185
186
187
188

ARCTIC COUNCIL, FRAMEWORK PLAN FOR COOPERATION, supra note 98.
Id. § 1.1.
Id. § 1.6.2.
Id. § 3.2.5; see also id. § 2.2.
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among industry operators and regulators; include indigenous peoples
in risk management efforts; and incorporate the work of standard
setting organizations.
With respect to industry, one of the 2014 Guidelines’
recommendations regarding the development of Arctic standards and
best practices is for private industry and public regulators to “work
together to initiate, implement, monitor, and continuously improve
standards and best practices for safety management systems and safety
culture in Arctic offshore oil and gas operations.”189 The document
also focuses on safety management and culture, noting that “regulators
must define and communicate expectations regarding positive safety
culture and require operators to establish, implement, and improve
their safety culture.”190 Recommended actions include requiring
“operators to have a verifiable process to improve safety culture
through constant monitoring and assessment and the use of leading
indicators” and “to designate a responsible and accountable person
(preferably the CEO) for their safety culture.”191
The 2014 Guidelines specifies nine safety management categories192
and its explication of those categories often includes direct references
to the interactions between industry and regulators. For example, with
respect to the category of continuous improvement, the guidelines
state: “Continuous improvement in offshore performance should be
seen as a collaborative activity requiring cooperation and actions by
both industry and regulators.”193 Similarly, most of the recommended
actions for risk assessment rely upon operators providing information
to regulators.194 And collaborative approaches for management of
189 ARCTIC COUNCIL, ARCTIC OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS GUIDELINES: SYSTEM SAFETY
MANAGEMENT AND SAFETY CULTURE 13 (Mar. 2014), available at http://oaarchive.arcticcouncil.org/bitstream/handle/11374/418/Systems%20Safety%20Management%20and%
20Safety%20Culture%20report.pdf.
190 Id. at 19.
191 Id. at 19-20.
192 These
categories include: (1) continuous improvement, (2) risk
assessment/hazard identification, (3) management of change, (4) training and
competence for the Arctic, (5) accountability and responsibility, (6) operating
procedures, (7) quality assurance/mechanical integrity, (8) documentation and
reporting, and (9) communications. See id. at 21-34.
193 Id. at 22. The 2014 Guidelines also state: Continuous improvement also should
involve “open and frequent communication with the operator about how to improve
their performance when deficiencies are identified.” Id.
194 Some examples include: (1) “Requir[ing] operators to assess risk in offshore
Arctic areas on an ongoing basis. Factors include: Geology in the well including
shallow gas, permafrost and methane hydrates; Weather, sea, ice; and Improvement in
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change, in addition to having regulators require operators to take a
variety of safety steps, include a mutual improvement process:
“Regulators and operators must constantly seek to improve their
approach to the ‘Management of Change’ through hazard
identification, risk analysis/assessment and better handling of any
changes to the drilling plan during the operational phase.”195
The Guidelines also directly acknowledge the important role of
indigenous peoples in helping to ensure safe operations and the need
to incorporate evolving standards created by multiple public and
private entities. For example, the operating procedures section notes:
“Consultation with local and indigenous communities with respect to
weather, sea state, ice, temperature and sensitive ecological conditions
can also provide a valuable additional source of information for
assessing overall safety and environmental risk.”196 That section also
references standard setting by the ISO, new U.S. standards, and an
Arctic Council taskforce as important in the context of establishing
operating procedures.197
Both the 2015 Framework Plan and 2014 Guidelines could go
further, however, in how they incorporate key actors into
implementation. Indigenous peoples, for example, are only mentioned
directly in the declarations and not in the implementation sections of
the 2015 Framework Plan. Yet even with these limitations, they serve
as a helpful example of how international agreements among nationstates and more informal work taking place under them can
acknowledge and include important non-nation-state actors,
something that numerous agreements in multiple contexts are
increasingly doing.198 This incorporation of stakeholders helps to
acknowledge the complex nature of governance in this context and
encourage needed cooperation.

the management of change.” Id. at 24. (2) “Requir[ing] the operator to regularly assess
risk relevant to operating in Arctic conditions in order to inform the process of
improving regulations, standards and industry guidance.” Id. (3) “Require the
operator to assess risks associated with cold environment technologies so that safety
performance can be improved before breakdowns or accidents happen.” Id.
195 Id. at 26-27.
196 Id. at 30.
197 Id.
198 For example, the agreements made at the Conferences of the Parties under the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change increasingly include
subnational actors in their provisions. Osofsky, Rethinking, supra note 168.
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Proposed Rule on Arctic Offshore Drilling

The Obama Administration’s Arctic-specific drilling rule proposed
by the BSEE in February 2015 mentions the Arctic Council and efforts
by standard setting bodies in multiple places. Its references to the
Arctic Council arise in its discussion of the National Strategy for the
Arctic Region (“National Arctic Strategy”) issued by President Obama
in May 2013. The proposed rule explains that the “National Arctic
Strategy is an example of the types of action the U.S. is taking to
implement its obligations under international agreements, such as the
Arctic Council’s Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution
Preparedness and Response in the Arctic.”199 Of particular significance
is that in this context the United States treats the Arctic Council
agreement as an international agreement, acknowledging obligations
for the United States despite the body’s soft law status.
The proposed rule also addresses many recommendations made in
recent reports on OCS oil and gas activities, including ones by the
Arctic Council. Examples include:
the Arctic Council, Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines
(2009); the National Commission on the BP Deepwater
Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling (2011); Ocean Energy
Safety Advisory Committee Recommendations (2013); DOI’s
60-Day Report (2013); the Working Group’s report entitled,
“Managing for the Future in a Rapidly Changing Arctic, A
Report to the President” (March 2013); the National Arctic
Strategy (May 2013); and the Arctic Council, Arctic Offshore
Oil and Gas Guidelines: Systems Safety Management and
Safety Culture (March 2014).200
Article 4 of the Arctic Council’s Agreement on Cooperation on
Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic is
specifically mentioned in the proposed rule, which notes that “for
‘areas of special ecological significance,’ each party ‘shall establish a
minimum level of pre-positioned oil spill combating equipment,
commensurate with the risk involved, and programs for its use.’”201
In addition, the new § 250.473(a) is interlinked with Arctic Council
approaches in its requirement “that all equipment and materials
proposed for use in exploratory drilling operations on the Arctic OCS

199
200
201

Arctic Drilling Rule, supra note 8, at 10.
Id. at 33-34.
Id. at 89.

2016]

Arctic Energy Cooperation

1491

be rated or de-rated for service under conditions that could be
reasonably expected during operations.”202 The new requirement is
based on recommendations from a 2009 Arctic Council report.203
Beyond harmonizing the U.S. approach with that of the Arctic
Council, the proposed rule explicitly incorporates standards for
transnational industry and standard setting bodies. For example, the
proposed rule would add subsection (h)(89) to existing § 250.198 to
incorporate the American Petroleum Institute (“API”) proposed draft
Recommended Practice (“RP”) 2N, Recommended Practice for Planning,
Designing, and Constructing Structures and Pipelines for Arctic
Conditions, Third Edition as a voluntary consensus standard.
This API document — which is virtually identical to a
standard previously issued by the International Organization
for Standardization (ISO), “Petroleum and Natural Gas
Industries Arctic Offshore Structures,” First Edition (2010)
(ISO 19906) — would be appropriate for certain aspects of
drilling operations, such as accounting for the severe weather
and thermal effects on structures, maintenance procedures,
and safety.204
Paragraph (g) of § 250.470 would require operators to “explain how
they utilized API RP 2N, Third Edition, in planning their Arctic OCS
exploratory drilling operations.”205
The BSEE is seeking comments concerning incorporation of API RP
2N and is also considering ISO 19906 and 19905-1 as alternatives.206 It
indicates in the proposed rule that:
ISO 19905-1 may be better suited than API RP 2N (or ISO
19906) to guide structural components for jack-up rigs. The
API RP 2N (or ISO 19906) and ISO 19905-1 documents
together would provide the most comprehensive structural
requirements for the use of a jack-up rig in Arctic
conditions.207

202

Id. at 100.
“The Arctic Council made similar recommendations for equipment and
materials in its 2009 report on Arctic oil and gas operations.” Id. at 101.
204 Id. at 66.
205 Id. at 77, 85.
206 Id. at 88.
207 Id. at 89.
203
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This consideration of multiple entities’ efforts in this context
represents an interesting example of how regulations can use and
evaluate industry standards.
3.

Proposed Rule on Blowout Preventer Systems and Well Control

Efforts to incorporate industry standards and involve industry are
not limited to the Arctic offshore drilling regulatory context. The
Obama Administration’s December 2014 proposed regulations on
Blowout Preventer Systems, which are key spill containment
mechanisms that failed during the BP Deepwater Horizon spill,
demonstrate similar dynamics with respect to offshore drilling more
broadly in U.S. domestic law.
Many standards in the proposed rule are based on API ones.208 The
proposed rule explicitly incorporates API Standard 53 — Blowout
Prevention Equipment Systems for Drilling Wells;209API
Recommended Practice 2RD — Design of Risers for Floating
Production Systems and Tension-Leg Platforms;210API Specification
Q1 — Specification for Quality Management System Requirements for
Manufacturing Organizations for the Petroleum and Natural Gas
Industry;211API Specification 6A — Specification for Wellhead and
Christmas Tree Equipment;212 American National Standards Institute
(“ANSI”)/API Specification 11D1 — Packers and Bridge Plugs;213
ANSI/API Specification 16A — Specification for Drill-through
208 See Blowout Preventer Rule, supra note 152, at 12. Some of the API standards
may be accessed for free and some which require a fee. If API standards are
incorporated into the final rule, the public could inspect or obtain the documents
through the BSEE or the National Archives and Records Administration (“NARA”). Id.
209 “This standard is to provide requirements for the installation and testing of
blowout prevention equipment systems whose primary functions are to confine well
fluids to the wellbore, provide means to add fluid to the wellbore, and allow
controlled volumes to be removed from the wellbore.” Id. at 13.
210 “This document addresses structural analysis procedures, design guidelines,
component selection criteria, and typical designs for all new riser systems used on
Floating Production Systems (FPSs and Tension-Leg Platforms (TLPs)).” Id. at 14.
211 “This specification establishes the minimum quality management system
requirements for organizations that manufacture products or provide manufacturingrelated processes under a product specification for use in the petroleum and natural
gas industry.” Id.
212 “This specification defines minimal requirements for the design of valves,
wellheads and Christmas tree equipment that is used during drilling and production
operations.” Id. at 14-15.
213 “This specification provides minimum requirements and guidelines for packers
and bridge plugs used downhole in oil and gas operations.” Id. at 15.
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Equipment;214API Specification 16C — Specification for Choke and
Kill Systems;215API Specification 16D — Specification for Control
Systems for Drilling Well Control Equipment and Control Systems for
Diverter Equipment;216ANSI/API Specification 17D — Design and
Operation of Subsea Production Systems — Subsea Wellhead and Tree
Equipment;217 and API Recommended Practice 17H — Remotely
Operated Tools and Interfaces on Subsea Production Systems.218
In addition to its incorporation of API standards, the proposed rule
also references the importance of stakeholder participation. For
instance, the proposed rule indicates that the BSEE recognized that it
was important to collect the best ideas on the prevention of wellcontrol incidents and blowouts to assist in the development of this
proposed rule. The rule explicitly states that these ideas “include the
knowledge and skillset that industry has, and BSEE wants to benefit
from that experience to improve the safety of all operations on the
OCS.”219 To that end, the “BSEE hosted a public offshore energy
forum that brought together Federal decision-makers, industry,
academia, and other stakeholders to discuss additional steps that BSEE
and the industry might take to continue to improve the reliability and
safety of BOPs” and “[d]iscussion panels consisted of representatives
from government organizations, trade associations, equipment
manufacturers, offshore operators, consultants, training companies,
214 “This specification defines requirements for performance, design, materials,
testing and inspection, welding, marking, handling, storing and shipping of BOPs and
drill-through equipment used for drilling for oil and gas.” Id.
215 “This specification was formulated to provide for safe and functionally
interchangeable surface and subsea choke and kill systems equipment utilized for
drilling oil and gas wells.” Id. at 16.
216 “This specification establishes design standards for systems that are used to
control BOPs and associated valves that control well pressure during drilling
operations.” Id. at 17.
217 “This specification provides specifications for subsea wellheads, mudline
wellheads, drill-through mudline wellheads and both vertical and horizontal subsea
trees.” Id. at 17-18.
218 “This recommended practice has been prepared to provide general
recommendations and overall guidance for the design and operation of remotely
operated tools (ROT) comprising ROT and ROV tooling used on offshore subsea
systems. ROT and ROV performance is critical to ensuring safe and reliable deepwater
operations and this document provides general performance guidelines for the
equipment.” Id. at 18. The proposed rule also mentions incorporation of standards in
the copyright context, noting that “[w]hen a copyrighted technical industry standard
is incorporated by reference into our regulations, BSEE is obligated to observe and
protect that copyright.” Id. at 11.
219 Id. at 22.
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and others.”220 Finally, the proposed rule notes that “in several
sections of the proposed regulations, BSEE would require third-party
verification of the design, maintenance, inspection, testing, and repair
of BOP systems and equipment by a BSEE-approved entity.”221
Although the Arctic Council documents reference collaboration
much more directly than the U.S. regulations do, the domestic
regulatory incorporation of specific API standards and Arctic Council
agreements helps to harmonize safety efforts across institutions in
important ways. This form of regulation does, however, have its limits.
Under U.S. law, some types of regulatory incorporation — particularly
ones that allow private institutions to write standards directly rather
than ones like these in which the government uses specific privatelycreated standards — will run up against constitutional constraints.222
More broadly, as discussed in more depth in Section III.D, public
institutions will have to be careful that privately created standards
actually serve the public interest. And the types of cooperation among
entities included in both the Arctic Council and U.S. regulatory efforts
do not always translate into more than surface inclusion.223 Despite
these limits, though, these three examples demonstrate the ways in
which fragmented institutions are bringing their efforts together in
written documents that guide them.

220

Id. at 22-23.
Id. at 29.
222 See Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1231 (2015)
(clarifying the constitutional limits on delegation to private entities); see also Jody
Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 581, 584-85
(2000) (“[T]he federal government thus retains considerable flexibility to make
substantial delegations of its responsibilities, and even of functions closely associated
with core sovereign powers, to private parties . . . . To enforce the nondelegation
doctrine using the traditional rationale would require the Court first to find that core
governmental functions do exist and then to distinguish them from peripheral
functions in a principled way, which would be a rather formalistic undertaking.”). For
analysis of ways in which governmental agencies increasingly contract out traditional
functions to private entities, see Jody Freeman, The Contracting State, 28 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 155, 155-214 (2000).
223 See infra Part III.D. Peter Strauss has explored the transparency and intellectual
property concerns that can arise when government incorporates private standards. See
Peter Strauss, Incorporating by Reference: Knowing the Law in the Electronic Age, 39
ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 36, 36 (2014) (analyzing the implications of a change in
regulations governing “incorporation by reference”); Peter Strauss, Private Standards
Organizations and Public Law, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J., 497, 518-37 (2013)
(exploring issues with the Office of the Federal Register’s approach to incorporation
by reference).
221
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C. Institutional Collaboration
Emerging hybrid cooperation in the Arctic is not simply taking place
through agreements, guidelines, and regulations. New institutional
forms are developing that help bring together key stakeholders, and
other more long-standing ones also have a role to play in offshore oil
and gas safety as drilling moves forward. This Section explores three
examples of collaboration through institutions: Arctic Inupiat
Offshore, LLC (“AIO”); Regional Citizens Advisory Councils; and the
Arctic Waterways Safety Committee.
1.

Arctic Inupiat Offshore, LLC

The Arctic Inupiat Offshore, LLC provides a particularly interesting
example of cooperation in this context because it involves two sets of
key stakeholders not always included fully in Arctic Council and
governmental regulatory efforts — a transnational oil corporation and
Alaska Native corporations. In July 2014,
Arctic Slope Regional Corporation (ASRC) and six (6) North
Slope village corporations . . . joined together to create a new
company known as the Arctic Inupiat Offshore, LLC (AIO).
AIO and Shell Gulf of Mexico Inc. (Shell) . . . entered into a
binding agreement that will allow AIO the option to acquire an
interest in Shell’s acreage and activities on its Chukchi Sea
leases. This interest will be managed by AIO.224
According to the agreement, Shell will assign to AIO an overriding
royalty interest in oil and gas produced from specific Chukchi Sea
leases. AIO also would have the option to participate in project
activities by acquiring a working interest at the time Shell makes the
decision to proceed with development and production. In addition,
“Shell and AIO will hold quarterly meetings to exchange information
and address regional and development issues.”225 Although Shell Oil
has indicated that it will not pursue Chukchi Sea drilling for the
foreseeable future, limiting the current practical impact of the
agreement, it serves as an interesting example of hybrid cooperation.
Unlike the co-management governance arrangements that were put
into place following the land claims agreements in Alaska,226 AIO is a
224

ASRC Press Release, supra note 179.
Id.
226 For an expanded discussion of Arctic co-management with a particular focus on
the whaling context, see Jessica M. Shadian, Of Whales and Oil: Inuit Resource
225
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direct collaboration with industry without government oversight,
intervention, or mandate. Thus, Alaska Native corporations not only gain
economically from industry profit, but they are also partners with
industry in the exploration and development of its oil and gas in that area.
According to Ukpeaġik Inupiat Corporation president and CEO, Anthony
E. Edwardsen, who was designated to serve as Chairman of AIO,
Our values teach us that we achieve success by putting the
needs of our community at the center of all that we do. It is
important that our community has a seat at the table to
represent the subsistence and economic needs of our
shareholders. Through AIO we will have meaningful input
into this process while providing benefits back to our
shareholders.227
More specifically, according to Olgoonik Corporation, the AIO-Shell
agreement aimed at accomplishing four particular goals for the Alaska
Native corporations participating.
Creating Alignment
Together, we will work to advocate for best practices from
Shell to ensure the subsistence and economic needs of our
people are addressed.
A Seat at the Table
This agreement gives us a strong, unified position on
development and subsistence matters — we are active
participants in the decisions impacting our communities.
Planning our Future
OCS development is occurring. This investment allows us
to . . . share in the rewards, and not just the risks, of OCS
development.
Economic Stability
Responsible resource development translates into economic
resources — sustainable employment and contracting
opportunities for our people and region.228
Governance and the Arctic Council, 49 POLAR REC. 392, 394-99 (2013).
227 ASRC Press Release, supra note 179.
228 AIO Quick Facts, OLGOONIK, http://www.olgoonik.com/arctic-inupiat-offshore
(last visited Feb. 23, 2016).
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This view of the agreement as creating an opportunity for multistakeholder interaction is not simply held by the Alaska Native
participants. Pete Slaiby, vice president of Shell Alaska at the time of
the agreement, explained that: “The agreement is about more than
spreading the benefits of offshore development. It’s really about what
it’s going to take to move us forward collaboratively. And it will take
all of us working together to move us forward in the Arctic.”229 Or as
Rex A. Rock, Sr., ASRC president and chief executive officer who will
also serve as president of AIO put it: “this arrangement balances the
risk of OCS development borne by our coastal communities with the
benefits intended to support our communities and our people.”230
Although this agreement did not include state or federal
governmental entities directly, elected officials praised the joint
venture. Alaska Gov. Sean Parnell lauded the creation of AIO and said
“Shell’s partnership with the Alaska Native corporations that will
provide a greater voice and opportunity for the people in the region
and a seat at the development table.”231 U.S. Sen. Lisa Murkowski, RAlaska, conveyed a similar sentiment: “This announcement ensures
that the people of the North Slope Borough share directly in the oil
and gas bounty off of their coast. It gives locals a say in what happens
near their communities. I think that’s a wise decision on Shell’s
part.”232 Although the Shell Oil pullout prevents an analysis in the
near term of how the agreement will play out in practice in the
management of offshore drilling in the Chukchi Sea, its approach and
the reactions of leaders to it suggest that it serves as a promising
model for the future.

229 Yereth Rosen, Shell, Native Corporations Unveil Joint Venture in Chukchi Sea
Leases, ARCTIC NEWSWIRE (July 31, 2014), http://www.adn.com/article/20140731/shellnative-corporations-unveil-joint-venture-chukchi-sea-leases.
230 Kristen Nelson, ASRC, Shell Form JV: Arctic Slope Regional Corp., 6 North Slope
Village Corporations, Create AIO, PETROLEUM NEWS (Aug. 10, 2014), http://www.
petroleumnews.com/pntruncate/798469612.shtml.
231 Id. He added that: “This establishes a very positive precedent in Alaska’s Outer
Continental Shelf, showing strategic partnership among North Slope communities and
Shell, both of which understand the importance of developing Alaska’s offshore oil
and gas resources.” Id.
232 Id. U.S. Sen. Mark Begich, D-Alaska, similarly expressed his excitement over
seeing Alaska Native corporations “take a stake in responsible development in their
backyard.” Id. He said “it’s good to see Shell partner with local communities and
corporations. Hopefully, we’ll see this partnership pay off in the very near future.” Id.
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Regional Citizens Advisory Councils

Unlike the new collaborations described in the sections that precede
and follow this one, RCACs have been a fixture in Alaska since soon
after the Exxon Valdez oil spill.233 Although they, like the Arctic
Waterways Safety Committee described in the following section, are
focused on waterway safety and pollution and thus primarily relevant
to the shipping aspect of offshore drilling, their longer tenure provides
an opportunity to assess the possibilities and limitations of multistakeholder institutions in fostering collaboration.234
In the aftermath of the Exxon Valdez spill, there were calls for a
broader set of stakeholders to participate in decision-making around oil
tanker safety and spill management. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990,
which was passed in response to the spill, attempted to address that
concern by providing a statutory basis for two RCACs, one in the Prince
William Sound region and the other in the Cook Inlet region. The
statute included guidelines for their membership to include key diverse
constituencies. A settlement with Exxon helped to fund them.235
233 See NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE
DRILLING, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE
FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING 268-69 (2011) [hereinafter NAT’L COMM’N REPORT];
Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Learning from Disasters: Twenty-One Years After the Exxon Valdez
Oil Spill, Will Reactions to the Deepwater Horizon Blowout Finally Address the Systemic
Flaws Revealed in Alaska?, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 11041, 11045-46 (2010) [hereinafter
Learning from Disasters], available at http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1327&context=lsfp (citing Jim Carlton, Bill Includes Citizens
Oil Panel for Gulf, Arctic Coasts, WALL ST. J. ONLINE (Aug. 2, 2010),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703292704575393492820269842);
Harlan Kirgan, Biloxi Beach Event to Call for Citizen Group to Monitor Oil and Gas
Activities in Gulf of Mexico, GULFLIVE.COM (June 24, 2011, 6:56 AM), http://
blog.gulflive.com/mississippi-press-news/2011/06/biloxi_beach_event_to_call_for.html.
234 This section draws from prior work of Hari Osofsky on RCACs, at times in
collaboration with Hannah Wiseman. See Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 175, at 2031; Osofsky, Multidimensional Governance, supra note 32, at 1127-28. However, it
provides original analysis of them in the context of emerging offshore Arctic drilling.
235 See Plater, Learning from Disasters, supra note 233, at 11046 (citing Oil
Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. § 2732(d) (2006)); see also Zygmunt J.B. Plater,
Facing a Time of Counter-Revolution — The Kepone Incident and a Review of First
Principles, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 657, 700-01 (1995) [hereinafter The Kepone Incident];
William H. Rodgers, Jr., The Most Creative Moments in the History of Environmental
Law: “The Whats,” 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 22-23; George Busenberg, Citizen Advisory
Councils and Environmental Management in the Marine Oil Trade 32 (1997)
(unpublished
manuscript),
available
at
http://www.circac.org/wp-content/
uploads/CACEnvironMg.pdf (studying the two advisory councils’ impacts on policy
change); About Us, supra note 136; Who We Are, COOK INLET REGIONAL CITIZENS
ADVISORY COUNCIL, http://www.circac.org/who-we-are (last visited Apr. 22, 2012).
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The Cook Inlet RCAC includes thirteen members from local
governments, Alaska Native groups, and others harmed by the Exxon
Valdez spill. It has worked on improving spill prevention and response
for the Inlet, including water pollution monitoring. The Prince
William Sound RCAC also involves multiple stakeholders with a
similar focus. However, its structure is somewhat different. Although
it was created through the OPA, this RCAC has funding from and a
contractual relationship with the Alyeska Pipeline Service Company,
which operates the Valdez terminal and the trans-Alaska pipeline.236
Both RCACs have been involved in a number of oil spill response
research initiatives.237
Assessments of the RCACs’ work indicate that these types of
institutions can serve as an important form of hybrid cooperation. For
instance Professor George Busenberg’s study of them explains that:
“the councils have operated as institutional learning arrangements (by
promoting the application of new ideas and information to policy
decisions in this system).”238 His study suggests that the RCAC’s
capacities varied based on their funding, but that each of them
influenced policy through their own work and through collaborations
with other institutions.239
Others have raised concerns with RCACs that potentially apply to
the other institutional arrangements discussed in this Part as well. In
particular, Zygmunt Plater has criticized RCACs’ lack of subpoena
power and the dependence on annual funds negotiations with
industry, as well as co-opting of board members.240 Especially because
236 See Plater, Learning from Disasters, supra note 233, at 11046; see also Plater, The
Kepone Incident, supra note 235 at 700-01; Rodgers, supra note 235, at 22-23;
Busenberg, supra note 235, at 32; About Us, supra note 136; Who We Are, supra note
235; History of the Council, PRINCE WILLIAM SOUND REGIONAL CITIZENS’ ADVISORY
COUNCIL, http://www.pwsrcac.org/about/history/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2012).
237 Oil Spill Response Gap, PRINCE WILLIAM SOUND REGIONAL CITIZENS’ ADVISORY
COUNCIL, http://www.pwsrcac.org/programs/oil-spill-response/oil-spill-response-gap/
(last visited Mar. 17, 2016); Oil Spill Prevention and Response, COOK INLET REGIONAL
CITIZENS’ ADVISORY COUNCIL, http://www.circac.org/what-we-do/oil-spill-preventionresponse/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2016).
238 See Busenberg, supra note 235, at 18-19.
239 See id. at 17-20.
240 See Plater, Learning from Disasters, supra note 233, at 11042-46. Plater’s
subsequent article that builds on this shorter piece provides more detailed analysis of
citizen’s councils, praising their accomplishments and analyzing challenges that they
have faced. See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, The Exxon Valdez Resurfaces in the Gulf of Mexico
. . . and the Hazards of “Megasystem Centripetal Di-Polarity,” 38 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REV. 391, 409-15 (2011). For analysis of RCACs that summarizes the additional
scholarly literature, see Mackenzie M. Consoer, Risk Governance Within Complex
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so many of the entities and rules discussed are drawing from efforts by
interested corporations, they are at some risk of regulatory capture (in
which private interests overtake public ones). While these limitations
do exist, RCACs serve as an important example of the ways in which
institutional innovation can provide important spaces for key
stakeholders to collaborate.
3.

Arctic Waterways Safety Committee

Arctic offshore drilling developments are expected to result in
increased use of the waterways. The U.S. Committee on the Maritime
Transportation System’s report, A 10-Year Projection Of Maritime
Activity in the U.S. Arctic Region, indicates for example that:
The preliminary revised draft OCS exploration plan submitted
by Shell to the U.S. Bureau of Ocean Energy Management
(BOEM) lists the vessels and the expected activity for the
proposed exploration. Many of the 22 support vessels such as
tugs, anchor handlers, and ice management vessels would
remain near the drill ship, contributing to on-site activity.
However, offshore supply vessels are anticipated to make up to
30 round trips to Kotzebue and/or Dutch Harbor.241
While Arctic offshore drilling provides an opportunity for economic
development and greater energy independence, the increased usage of
Arctic waterways raises a number of concerns for the variety of
stakeholders who make daily use of and rely on these waterways for
other activities.
For example, many communities in the OCS depend upon a
subsistence lifestyle. George Noongwook is a whaling captain from
Savoonga, Alaska, Chair of the Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission,
and also an alternate Chair of the Arctic Waterways Safety Committee
(“AWSC”). Mr. Noongwook explains, “We don’t get much food from
the store. We get most of our food from the ocean — whales, walrus,
and fish. This is how we feed our children, our families, and our
elders.”242 Maintaining a subsistence lifestyle in the face of the
and Uncertain Environments: A Retrospective Analysis of the Regional Citizens’
Advisory Councils in Alaska (May 8, 2012) (unpublished M.S. thesis, University of
Minnesota) (on file with authors).
241 THE INT’L COUNCIL ON CLEAN TRANSP., A 10-YEAR PROJECTION OF MARITIME
ACTIVITY IN THE U.S. ARCTIC REGION 25 (2015), available at http://www.cmts.gov/
downloads/CMTS_10-Year_Arctic_Vessel_Projection_Report_1.1.15.pdf.
242 Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission Defends Bowhead Quota, IWC: THE WORLD IS
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anticipated growth in maritime travel is a principal concern for many
communities.243
To address these concerns “the AWSC was established in October
2014 as a self-governing multi-stakeholder group focused on creating
or documenting best practices to ensure a safe, efficient, and
predictable operating environment for all users of the arctic
waterways.”244 Committee members are a wide array of Arctic
maritime users and stakeholders and “fall under three categories:
Subsistence Hunters, Industry, and Other representatives. Each
category has five seats, each with a vote in decisions made by the
organization.”245 Committee members include Mr. Noongwook with
whaling expertise and an understanding of traditional knowledge,
advocacy group representatives, mayors, “offshore oil and gas
developers, and tug and barge operators.”246
“The mission of the AWSC is to provide a proactive forum for
identifying, assessing, planning, communicating, and implementing
measures that enhance safe, secure, efficient and environmentally sound
maritime operations in the U.S. Arctic waters.”247 The committee’s
WATCHING (July 3, 2012), https://iwcblogger.wordpress.com/2012/07/03/alaskaeskimo-whaling-commission-defends-bowhead-quota.
243 See Francesca Fenzi, Municipalities, Subsistence Hunters Join Forces to Establish Arctic
Waterway Safety Commission, KNOM RADIO MISSION (Nov. 4, 2014),
http://www.knom.org/wp/blog/2014/11/04/municipalities-subsistence-hunters-join-forcesto-establish-arctic-waterway-safety-committee/#more-12721 (describing the members and
goals of AWSC).
244 Our Work, ARCTIC WATERWAYS SAFETY COMMITTEE, http://www.arcticwaterways.
org/attorneys-1.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2016). In 2014, the Wildlife Conservation Society
received a $101,237.95 grant from the National Fish and Wildlife Foundation’s Alaska Fish
and Wildlife Fund to develop a Waterway Safety Committee for the protection of marine
mammals and subsistence activities (grant ID 45438). See 2014 Alaska Fish and Wildlife
Fund Grant Awards, NAT’L FISH & WILDLIFE FOUND., http://www.nfwf.org/afwf/
Documents/2014%20AFWF%20Funded%20Projects.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2015).
“Support for the Alaska Fish and Wildlife Fund is provided by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service, Bureau of Land Management, USDA Forest Service, National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration, ConocoPhillips Alaska, Shell, Donlin Gold LLC,
NOVAGOLD Resources, and community service payments from court settlements from
various federal pollution law violations.” Alaska Fish and Wildlife Fund, NAT’L FISH &
WILDLIFE FOUND., http://www.nfwf.org/afwf/Pages/home.aspx (last visited Oct. 14, 2015).
245 Our Work, supra note 244.
246 Carey Restino, Committee Begins Work on Arctic Waterway Safety, ARCTIC
SOUNDER (Mar. 27, 2015), http://www.thearcticsounder.com/article/1513committee_
begins_work_on_arctic_waterway.
247 Arctic Waterways Safety Committee Presentations, INST. NORTH, https://
www.institutenorth.org/news/entry/arctic-water-ways-safety-committee-presentations
(last visited Jan. 22, 2016) (follow “Marine Exchange of Alaska” hyperlink).
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purpose is to “bring together local marine interests in the Alaskan Arctic
in a single forum, and to act collectively on behalf of those interests to
develop best practices to ensure a safe, efficient, and predictable
operating environment for all current and future users of the
waterway.”248 Its focus is to ensure “communication between members,
improving the safety of the Arctic Maritime Transportation System, and
generating consensus between AWSC members on issues impacting the
Arctic Maritime Transportation System.”249 According to AWSC Bylaws,
these goals will be achieved by “[f]acilitat[ing] the continued safe and
efficient economic development, commerce, and subsistence practices
that are vital to local economies” and “[a]ct[ing] as a resource at the
request of governmental bodies and individual legislators regarding
issues related to marine operational and environmental safety.”250
Ultimately, AWSC will create best management plans that address the
diverse interests in Arctic waterways.
Most relevant for this Article, the AWSC aims to balance the diverse
interests in the Arctic waterways in the face of increased maritime
travel, due in part to Arctic offshore drilling. “This committee would
give various stakeholders a forum to solve differences in the Arctic
waterways without involving regulatory intervention from federal
authorities therefore avoiding a drawn out bureaucratic process.”251
The Prevention Division of the U.S. Coast Guard initiated the
formation of the AWSC by holding the first meeting with
representatives from a number of different stakeholder groups. The
idea came from similar committees developed in Puget Sound,
Washington, Los Angeles, California, and southeast Texas.252 While
the U.S. Coast Guard envisioned the AWSC and helped with the
formation, the AWSC is now an independently functioning institution.
The first formal meeting was held in March 2015 in Juneau and the
second took place in June 2015 at the Dena’ina Center in Anchorage.
All meetings are open to the public.253 From the start, the AWSC has
sought to involve a broad range of stakeholders: “While the Coast
248 Safe and Responsible Marine Practices in the Arctic, ARCTIC WATERWAYS SAFETY
COMMITTEE, http://www.arcticwaterways.org (last visited Jan. 24, 2016).
249 Diana Honings, A Framework for a Safer Arctic, COAST GUARD ALASKA (Sept. 5,
2014), http://alaska.coastguard.dodlive.mil/2014/09/a-framework-for-a-safer-arctic.
250 ARCTIC WATERWAYS SAFETY COMM., BYLAWS § II.5, II.7, available at http://
nebula.wsimg.com/5acd1bcd24462dfe3a1179128c6c2f31?AccessKeyId=4913A243119CE1
325FB9&disposition.
251 Honings, supra note 249.
252 See id.
253 See id.
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Guard is providing a framework for this maritime committee, the
committee will be established based solely on the collective group of
stakeholders to include representatives from local and tribal
governments, subsistence hunter co-management groups, advocacy
organizations, the maritime industry and community members.”254
The AWSC is already communicating concerns over the changing
conditions of the Arctic waterways and the need for balancing diverse
interests with politicians. For example, the AWSC met with Senator
Donald Olson to convey the need for and emerging collaboration
between locals and new economic interests that are coming in.255
Although the AWSC only addresses one aspect of offshore drilling
risks — those created by vessel transport — its institutional structure
and approach provides another example of hybrid cooperation. Like
the agreements more specific to offshore oil and gas safety emerging
from the Arctic Council and the other institutions described in this
Part, the AWSC provides mechanisms for needed interaction crucial to
multi-stakeholder cooperation.
At the same time, although all three institutions represent
innovative institutional mechanisms for creating hybrid cooperation,
fragmentation remains between these institutions and other aspects of
Arctic regional governance. For example, these institutions are not
integrated into the Arctic Council’s efforts (for example, the
establishment of the Arctic Coast Guard Forum in October 2015) to
include stakeholders as it shapes regional policies for Arctic offshore
oil and gas development.256 In addition, while it seems likely that the
254

Id.
See Sen. Donald Olson, Arctic, ULU NEWSL. (Mar. 25, 2015),
http://alaskasenatedems.com/senator/olson/032515_newsletter.htm (“This week in
Arctic Policy we had visitors from the Arctic Waterways Safety Committee come
testify. They told of the melting ice and the devastating effects that it created but they
also told of the new opportunities that are created with the melting ice: new
waterways that we couldn’t travel through before, new scientific studies that are being
done, and international interest in water routes and resources. However, with all of
these new interests and happenings in our waters they told of the collaboration that is
needed between the locals who already use the water and the new traffic of people that
are coming and bringing in new economic opportunity. They explained further that
they have been collaborating with other organizations to develop different routes for
new vessel travel to reduce travel time for the organization while keeping the hunting
waters safe. Those who were present in the meeting from the district were: Charlie
Brower from Barrow, Vera Metcalf from Nome, George Noongwook from Savoonga,
Willie Goodwin from Kotzebue, Wendie Schaeffer from Kotzebue, Arnold Brower, Jr.
from Barrow, Jack Omelak from Nome, and Mayor Denise Michels from Nome.”).
256 See Arctic Coast Guard Forum Members, Joint Statement of the Intent to Further
Develop Multilateral Cooperation of Agencies Representing Coast Guard Functions (Oct.
255
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AWSC, like the RCACs, will have influence over time in some of the
same ways Busenberg noted in that context, a key question regarding
both sets of institutions, however, is whether they will effect U.S.
domestic policy or Arctic regional policy more broadly. And, as
explored more in the next section, all three of the institutions face
risks of private capture — particularly the AIO-Shell Oil collaboration
(or future collaborations framed similarly) with its economic
development orientation and corporate involvement.257
D. Benefits and Limitations of Hybrid Cooperation
The implicit and explicit cooperation analyzed in this Part
represents only a small fraction of the governance efforts taking place
around Arctic offshore drilling. The Part focuses on the U.S. context
and a representative selection of regulatory and institutional
developments. But these agreements, rules, and institutions serve as
helpful examples for evaluating mechanisms for achieving greater
harmonization and inclusion of key stakeholders in this complex
regulatory environment.
This Section’s assessment builds on the prior work of Hari Osofsky
and Hannah Wiseman in Hybrid Energy Governance evaluating the
success of hybrid institutions in the broader U.S. energy governance
context.258 That Article suggests that evaluations of the success or
failure of governance innovation should focus on both substantive and
structural aspects. In other words, assessment should include whether
governance innovation achieves the goals that it was set up to
accomplish substantively and addresses underlying governance
problems in the process.259 Translating that idea into this context, we
ask: Do these examples (1) substantively have the potential to make
offshore drilling safer and (2) structurally address the governance
problems identified in Part II and help to develop regional Arctic
energy governance? Our answer to both of these questions is a
30, 2015), available at http://arctic-council.org/eppr/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/2015_
11_05_ACGF_Joint-Statement_Final_Approved.pdf (establishing Arctic Coast Guard
Forum); Ernie Regehr, The Arctic Coast Guard Forum: Advancing Governance and
Cooperation in the Arctic (Nov. 12, 2015) (Simons Foundation Briefing Paper), available at
http://www.thesimonsfoundation.ca/sites/all/files/The%20Arctic%20Coast%20Guard%20
Forum-advancing%20governance%20and%20cooperation%20in%20the%20Arctic%20%20DAS%2C%20November%2012%202015_4.pdf (describing Arctic Coast Guard
Forum).
257 See infra Part III.D.
258 See Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 175, at 56-57.
259 See id.
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tentative “yes,” with the caveat that most of these regulations and
institutions are too new to yield clear results.
1.

Substantive Assessment

With respect to offshore drilling safety, each of the examples has the
potential to help with spill prevention and/or response, but they have
not been fully tested due to how new they are and the limited U.S.
Arctic offshore drilling to date. With respect to the regulations, as this
section explores, the Arctic Council’s 2015 Framework Plan for
Cooperation on Prevention of Oil Pollution and Offshore Oil and Gas
Guidelines and the U.S. federal regulations implement some of the
recommendations of the National Commission on the Deepwater
Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling in the ways in which they frame
the governmental-corporate interactions and bring together different
types of standards. The institutions similarly provide opportunities for
substantive progress through the processes they create among key
stakeholders. Although neither of these qualities guarantee better
drilling safety, they are both promising as explored below.260
The Arctic Council’s 2015 Framework Plan, as described in Section
III.B.1, contains specific language about relevant collaboration with
industry, but by its nature, does not fill in the details. However, the
2014 Offshore Guidelines are far more specific, and seem designed to
address some of the safety culture problems that led to the BP
Deepwater Horizon spill. In particular, the National Commission on
that spill found that systemic regulatory failures caused the spill, and
proposed a consideration of a more “proactive, risk-based performance
approach” modeled on the “safety case” strategy used in the North
Sea.261 The 2014 Guidelines’ inclusion of specific provisions on safety
culture provides an opportunity to test this recommendation in the
Arctic context. Moreover, the Guidelines’ delineation of safety
management categories that include industry-regulatory interaction
and a role for indigenous peoples and their knowledge has the
potential to help harmonize safety efforts across nation-states and
corporate and indigenous stakeholders.262 The new U.S. regulatory
efforts regarding Arctic offshore drilling and blowout preventers
similarly implement the Commission’s recommendation to update

260
261
262

See NAT’L COMM’N REPORT, supra note 233, at 269.
Id. at 252.
See supra Part III.A.
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regulation, and do so in a way that reflects both governmental and
industry efforts in the aftermath of the 2010 spill.263
The three institutions described in Section III.C — AIO, RCACs, and
AWSC — each have the potential to advance safety (with that potential
somewhat realized in the more long-standing RCACs) through the way in
which they involve key stakeholders in decision-making related to safety.
AIO focuses on shared economic benefits for indigenous peoples by
bringing Alaska Native corporations to the table as full participants. AIO
was also structured to provide an opportunity for them to help shape the
development in ways that could lessen risk of harm to Alaska Native
communities.264 The RCACs, through their decades of experiment and
assessment, have brought key stakeholders together to produce
recommendations about how to limit risks.265 Finally, AWSC already
seems to be making constructive interventions on various aspects of
transportation safety.266
Despite these indicators of these institutions’ capacity to contribute
to spill prevention and response, it remains unclear how each of them
will cooperate with more formal channels of policy such as BSEE at a
U.S. federal level and the Arctic Council at a regional level. Such
interconnection is important to ensuring that their efforts and aims are
carried through into practice. In order for them to be maximally
effective, their institutional collaboration should help foster the other
form of hybrid cooperation, regulatory incorporation, with their work
being brought into the formal structures and soft law standards for
Arctic offshore energy governance. Overall, while only time will tell if
the newer regulatory and institutional innovations described in this
Part will realize their promise, they seem designed to address
important safety concerns in the way in which they harmonize efforts
among key stakeholders.
2.

Structural Assessment

With the same caveat as in the previous section that it is too early to
know how these developments will play out over time, the examples
of hybrid cooperation that this Part explores all seem to decrease the
fragmentation analyzed in Part II. Each of them brings together key
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See NAT’L COMM’N REPORT, supra note 233, at 252; supra Part II.B.
See supra Part III.A.
See supra Part III.C.2.
See supra Part III.C.3.
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stakeholders and regulatory approaches in ways that make Arctic
offshore drilling governance more coherent.
When the Arctic Council and U.S. federal government use standards
created by transnational industry and standard-setting entities, they
ensure that corporations engaging in offshore drilling have a clear and
consistent set of standards to follow.267 This harmonization — so long
as the standards are well designed and appropriate — helps reduce
costs, improve safety, and decrease confusion.
Similarly, when key stakeholders work together in institutions like
the AIO, RCACs, and AWSC, they create a coherency across the
diversity of participants in different aspects of Arctic offshore drilling.
The more well-established RCACs provide an example of this
structural inclusion of stakeholders leading to harmonized
approaches.268
However, for both types of hybrid cooperation, there is a risk that
private and public interests may not align (or have equal enough
financial means for stakeholders to represent their interests
sufficiently).269 When industry-developed standards are used and
corporate participants are included, their know-how can be
incorporated, but as noted above in the discussion of the specific
examples, a risk of regulatory capture exists. Participation in
regulatory development and emerging institutions needs to be assessed
over time to make sure that their processes include all stakeholders in
a meaningful way.
Specifically, stakeholder participation should amount to real input
into regulatory processes (not merely symbolic forms of consultation
carried out to meet regulatory demands). Multi-stakeholder processes
in institutions do not always translate into regulatory or project input,
which increases the risk that resulting standards will be dominated by
the most powerful special interests, in this case oil and gas industry
ones.270 For example, a number of Alaskan Inupiat politicians,
aboriginal consultants and academics have raised the concern that U.S.
and Canadian consultation processes with indigenous peoples are
often burdensome without having clear influence on the resulting

267

See supra Parts III.A., III.B.
See supra Part III.C.
269 See BEST PRACTICES IN ECOSYSTEM-BASED OCEANS MANAGEMENT IN THE ARCTIC 112
(Alf Håkon Hoel ed., 2009), available at http://www.pame.is/images/03_Projects/EA/
EA/BePOMAr.pdf; Bradley Karkkainen, Marine Ecosystem Management & A “PostSovereign” Transboundary Governance, 6 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 113, 124 (2004).
270 See Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 175, at 61-64.
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regulations. They argue for further assessment of these processes’
influence.271 Similar assessments are needed with respect to this
Article’s case studies.
However, despite these limitations, the examples of hybrid
cooperation explored in this Article have the potential to help address
safety and governance concerns in needed ways. They are certainly not
a panacea, but they serve as important and promising developments in
the complex and emerging regulatory governance of Arctic offshore
drilling. The conclusion that follows considers whether these
instances of hybrid cooperation, when combined, have the potential to
evolve into or assist the development of a more integrated regional
Arctic offshore oil and gas governance system.
CONCLUSION
This Article has three core conclusions about the current state of
and future possibilities for energy governance in the Arctic. First, the
complex, multilevel, multi-actor regulatory efforts in the context of
Arctic offshore drilling create a major regulatory challenge. Arctic
offshore drilling safety is hard to address fully through treaties and
national regulations because many key stakeholders are taking
measures to address safety that are not fully captured in those
processes.272
Second, Arctic Council agreements, U.S. federal laws, and emerging
Arctic institutions at multiple levels are bringing these diverse streams
together. Hybrid collaboration is emerging across governance scales,
with different variations of the public and private stakeholders it
includes. This Article’s case studies provide examples of some of the
forms that such convergence can take. Although they range from the
U.S. federal government incorporating standards created by
transnational industry and standard-setting bodies to Alaska Native
271 See Henry P. Huntington, Aqqaluk Lynge, Jimmy Stotts, Andrew Hartsig, Louie
Porta & Chris Debicki, Less Ice, More Talk: The Benefits and Burdens for Arctic
Communities of Consultations Concerning Development Activities, 6 CARBON & CLIMATE
L. REV. 33 (2012).
Henry Huntington (Eagle River, Alaska) is the Arctic Science Director for the Pew
Environment Group. Aqqaluk Lynge (Nuuk, Greenland) is Chairman of the ICC.
Jimmy Stotts (Anchorage and Barrow, Alaska) is President of ICC-Alaska. Andrew
Hartsig (Anchorage, Alaska) is Arctic Program Director for Ocean Conservancy. Louie
Porta (Nelson, British Columbia, Canada) is Science and Policy Advisor for Oceans
North Canada. Chris Debicki (Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada) is Nunavut Projects
Director for Oceans North Canada. Id. at 33.
272 See supra Part II.
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corporations cooperating with a multi-national oil and gas
corporation, they all have a core function in common. These efforts at
regulatory incorporation and new institutional collaborations are
decreasing fragmentation in ways that have the potential to make
Arctic offshore drilling safer.273
Third, despite these promising examples of hybrid cooperation, a
major challenge remains for achieving coherent regional governance of
offshore drilling. It is unclear whether this mosaic of emerging
regulatory and institutional interconnections will be adequate to bring
together key actors and initiatives. Arctic Council efforts, for example,
do not yet integrate those of RCACs or of the more recently created
AIO and AWSC. The experiences of the Exxon Valdez and BP
Deepwater Horizon spill indicate, though, that such integration could
serve a critical role for local communities who have served and would
like to serve as first responders274 and have traditional knowledge that
could assist with detecting and monitoring environmental changes.275
Greater regional coherence is also needed because a major oil spill in
the Arctic would likely have transboundary impacts due to the
physical geography of its seas, broader ocean, and coastline and the
proximity of drill sites to national borders.276
In the final analysis, the efforts at regulatory integration and
institutional collaboration analyzed in this Article may collectively
serve to plant the seeds of more coherent Arctic energy governance.
These iterations of cooperation in and among a variety of institutions
are helping to develop new norms for how to operate in the Arctic.
For example, regional and national governance bodies incorporate
parallel government standards while key actors from those public
institutions interact with multi-stakeholder bodies that are working
towards better protocols. Further research is needed into how these
norms are established and then reified through formal policy,
especially as the newer regulations are tested and institutions mature.
Moreover, this concept of hybrid cooperation has possibilities for
understanding emerging governance in other complex areas with
significant regulatory and institutional overlap, such as humanitarian
crisis management, transnational investment, and climate change.
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flows, emerging weather patterns, etc.
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Effective governance in this context is challenging, and existing and
nascent institutional structures are trying to respond to that challenge.
Even if these instances of hybrid cooperation are not comprehensive
enough to include all key stakeholders or address all fragmentation,
they serve as an important example of possible pathways forward in
this context and other complex governance contexts. If multiple
institutions can create needed interweaving of regulation and
stakeholders, they can develop a web of collaboration that is itself
hybrid and can constructively address governance concerns.

